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THE FUTURE OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: LEGISLATION
AND PUBLIC OPINION
Roberta Romano"
Recent state takeover regulation has reinvigorated the debate
over which level of government, state or federal, produces superior
corporation laws. Management, which vigorously supports state
legislation, has a conflict of interest concerning bids: successful
takeovers can jeopardize its employment. Shareholders, however,
are benefited by successful offers as they receive the bid premium,
and they are benefited by the threat of offers, which keeps manage-
ment on its toes. Most commentators, accordingly, consider state
takeover laws to be troubling features in corporation codes because
of the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The
statutes make hostile takeovers more difficult, and any increase in a
bidder's costs reduces the number of bids that will occur, which
weakens the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control
on managers. Consequently, as state legislatures have responded to
management pleas to restrict hostile takeovers, there have been calls
for federal legislation to preempt state takeover regulation. Partly
due to lingering concern over the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes, the supporters of restrictive legislation have, however, al-
ways worked on parallel fronts, advocating greater federal regula-
tion of takeovers at the same time as they championed state takeover
laws.
The focus of this Article is on the wisdom of promoting further
federal action on takeovers~ The Article begins by tracing the
course of state takeover regulation, which frames the debate over
federal action. It next reviews the theoretical foundation for federal
intervention in takeovers. This is an analysis derived from externali-
ties and jurisdictional spillovers and borne out by the politics of
state takeover laws. It is complicated, however, by the persistence at
the national level of collective action problems involving asymmetric
organizational advantages of managers over shareholders. The core
of the Article then follows, addressing the more important positive
question, what will be the probable output of federal action? To
answer this question, the Article examines the pattern of proposals
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introduced in Congress over the past twenty-five years that involve
acquisitions. Previously-introduced bills can be informative about
the contours of future legislation because a characteristic of success-
ful policy initiation is the recombination and recycling of a limited
number of preexisting policy alternatives. The Article also looks at
the data on public opinion regarding takeovers for the same time
frame. Public opinion is useful as an aid in understanding better the
political calculus of legislators because it influences when a particu-
lar alternative moves up the policy agenda.
My findings, in a nutshell, are that the bills introduced in Con-
gress have sought to increase the regulation of bidders. In addition,
a plurality of the public has consistently expressed a negative atti-
tude towards corporate acquisitions, and a majority consistently re-
ports disinterest in, and lack of knowledge about, such transactions.
Given this data, my prognosis is that any Congressional action is
.likely to mimic the states in the drive to restrict bidders, an outcome
which undermines the theoretical case for federal legislation. Pro-
ponents of federal action to halt the regulatory trend in the states
should therefore shift some of their effort to educating the public
about the beneficial effects of an active market for corporate control.
Without a more informed and sensitized public, preemption will in
all likelihood take the form of a federal version of a state takeover
statute.
I. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. The path of state regulation of takeovers.
The first state takeover law was enacted in Virginia in 1968, at
approximately the same time as the federal government moved to
regulate bids with the Williams Act. Virginia's statute was a widely
imitated corporate law innovation, as thirty-seven states adopted
similar laws, with most enactments occurring between 1975 and
1980. The action by the states is strongly correlated with takeover
activity: as an examination of Table 1 makes plain, the pioneering
statutes and the burst of imitations occurred as the number of
tender offers was sharply increasing. l The strength of this relation,
1. The figures on tender offers in Table 1 are from Douglas V. Austin's database, as
reproduced in Austin, Nigem & Bernard, Tender Offer Update: 1987, 22 MERGERS AND
ACQ.UISITIONS 49, 49-50 (1987); Austin & Mandula, Tender Offer Update 1986, 21 MERGERS
AND ACQ.UlSITIONS 55, 55-56 (1986); Austin, Tender Offer Update: 1978-1979, 15 MERGERS
AND ACQ.UlSITIONS 13, 14, 18 (1980). I use Austin's data because it is the most
comprehensive database for the variables of interest. Other published databases on
acquisitions either have not been tabulated for the entire time period, or do not
separately classify takeovers and whether or not an offer was contested. I did, however,
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the responsiveness of legislators to acquisition activity, is supported
by conventional statistical measures of association: the Pearson
product moment correlation coefficient of .6613 between the
number of statutes enacted per year and the number of tender offers
is significant at less than .001.2
The Supreme Court temporarily derailed dual jurisdiction of
tender offers in 1982 when it held, in Edgar v. MITE, Illinois' take-
over statute unconstitutional.3 The statute was found to burden im-
permissibly interstate commerce by going beyond the strictures of
the Williams Act in delaying the consummation of bids, and by cov-
ering bids for firms that could be subject to regulation by other
states as well. Because the Court did not state in MITE that the
Illinois provision was preempted by the Williams Act, continued
regulation of takeovers by the states was still a possibility. Accord-
ingly, states immediately fashioned second generation takeover stat-
utes to impede the activities of bidders once again. Given the
constitutional failure of the initial takeover statutes that were pat-
terned after blue sky regulation, the new laws were rooted in tradi-
tional areas of corporate governance, the regulation of business
combinations and shareholder voting rights. Hence only one juris-
diction was implicated, that of the conventional choice of law rule,
the state of incorporation. This formula proved to be successful. In
1987, the Supreme Court upheld Indiana's second generation stat-
examine the correlations for all the variables discussed in the text with the acquisition
series of two other databases: W.T. Grimm's count of announced mergers from 1963-
1986 and of takeovers and contested offers from 1971-1986, which are published in its
Mergerstat Review volumes; and Mergers and Acquisitions magazine's (M&A) count of
acquisitions, which extends over the period of 1967-1986 and includes foreign
corporations in the earlier years. State legislative activity was statistically significantly
correlated with the M&A series (Pearson correlation of .4487), but with none of the
Grimm data. However, the pattern of acquisitions in the Grimm data differs significantly
from the pattern in other series such as the M&A data and the Federal Trade
Commission database of large mergers, which ends in 1979. See Golbe & White, Mergers
and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy: An Aggregate and Historical Overview, MERGERS AND
ACQ.UISITIONS 25, 27-36 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988). But the Austin series is significantly
positively correlated with the Grimm takeover series (Pearson correlation of .6230), as
well as with the M&A series (Pearson correlation of .4702).
2. The Pearson correlation assumes that the variables are normally distributed.
Because conventional tesls of normality (stem and leaf and box plots and the Shapiro-
Wilk W statistic) of the statutes variable indicate that the normality assumption may be
questioned, I also computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which is a
measure that does not require normality. The Spearman coefficient of .6590 is equally
significant.
3. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). These first generation takeover
statutes typically imposed notification and disclosure requirements more stringent than
the Williams Act, and required, or permitted targets to request, a hearing by a state
agency on the fairness of the bid.
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Table 1. Legislative Activity and Tender Offers.
New State Bills in Tender Contested
Year Statutes Congress Offers Offers (%Total)
1963 0 0 21 n.a.
1964 0 0 12 n.a.
1965 0 3 35 n.a.
1966 0 I 45 n.a.
1967 0 5 86 n.a.
1968* 1 I 62 n.a.
1969 2 8 49 n.a.
1970 0 3 15 n.a.
1971 I I 6 n.a.
1972 0 3 29 13 (65%)
1973 I 2 80 35 (63%)
1974 2 10 68 43 (78%)
1975 5 23 71 19 (76%)
1976+ 11 3 132 26 (30%)
1977 8 4 181 18 (30%)
1978 4 0 166 38 (28%)
1979 0 5 114 12 (13%)
1980 1 1 83 16 (21 %)
1981 1 16 128 74 (62%)
1982** I 10 96 32 (39%)
1983 2 6 77 26 (35%)
1984 7 29 142 33 (23%)
1985 10 41 121 43 (36%)
1986 5 4 183 42 (24%)





ute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.4 This led the new
Chairman of the SEC, David Ruder, to lobby for congressional ac-
tion. In testimony before a House Committee after the CTS deci-
sion, he advocated giving the SEC authority to preempt state
regulation of takeovers. 5 He is not alone in this view: in a survey by
the New York Society of Security Analysts of its members, a majority
4. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Cl. 1637 (1987).
5. Pending Legislation Regarding Contests for Corporate Control: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Telecommunications & Finance of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, IOOth Cong., 1st
Sess. 69 (1987) (statement of David S. Ruder).
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 461 1988-1989
1988] FUTURE OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS 461
of respondents favored federal legislation on mergers and acquisi-
tions over regulation by the states.6
Although more than twenty states enacted second generation stat-
utes in the years between the MITE and CTS decisions, legislators
and lobbyists were often reluctant to promote legislation for fear of
constitutional infirmities. 7 The most frequently adopted version of
a second generation statute was therefore one with limited regula-
tory scope.s After the CTS decision, however, the pace and scope of
legislation changed: fourteen new statutes were adopted within ap-
proximately six months. More important, several of the new stat-
utes strengthened less restrictive second generation statutes by
using Indiana as a model, and many test CTS's limits by mandating
constraints on bidders that go further than the Indiana statute.9
The political history of second generation takeover statutes is
similar across the states. The statutes are typically enacted rapidly,
with virtually unanimous support and little public notice, let alone
discussion. to They are frequently pushed through the legislature at
the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile
bid or apprehensive that it will become a target. 11 This phenome-
6. New York Society of Security Analysts, "NYSSA Announces Results of Second
Shareholder Rights Survey," News Release (May 9, 1988) (52% favor federal legislation;
27% favor state legislation; 21 % no opinion). Between 250-270 of 5,000 members
responded. (Telephone conversation wilh John McCabe, NYSSA President).
7. E.g., Dept. of Legislative Reference, Staff Report to the General Assembly of Maryland
on Corporations and Associations: Consideration of the Problem of Special Voting Requirements in
Consolidations, Mergers, Takeovers, and Transfers ofAssets, Extraordinary Sess., 9, 65-72 Uune
1983).
8. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV~ Ill, 114-15
(1987).
9. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon 1987); DEL CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 203
(1988).
10. Romano, supra note 8, at 138.
II. There are at least a dozen examples among second generation statutes:
Connecticut for Aetna; Florida for Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (hostile bid by Robert
Maxwell); Massachusetts for Gillette (hoslile bid by Revlon Group); North Carolina for
Burlinglon Industries (hostile bid by Dominion Textile and Asher Edelman); Kentucky
for Ashland Oil (hostile bid by the Belzberg brothers); Pennsylvania for Scott Paper
(hostile stockholder Brascan Ltd. trying to increase stake); Ohio for Goodyear Tire &
Rubber (hostile bid by Sir Oliver Goldsmith); Ohio for Federated Department Stores
(hostile bid by Campeau Corp., statute regulating foreign bidders); Arizona for
Greyhound; Minnesota for Dayton Hudson (hostile bid by Dart Group); Wisconsin for
G. Heileman Brewing Co. (hostile bid by Bond Holdings); Washington for
Weyerhauser; Indiana for Arvin Industries (hostile bid by the Belzbergs), AMOCO also
promoted bill; Illinois for an unidentified corporation, see McKenna & Bitner, The "Fair
Price Amendment" in the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 67 CHICAGO BAR REC., 64, 74 n.59
(1986) ("one prominent Illinois Corporation" promoted statute); Maine for an
unidentified corporation, see Maine Legislative Record-House, June 3, 1985, at 918
(remarks of Rep. Stevens, referring to the "corporation that was the instigator" of the
bill); Washington for Boeing (facing possible hostile bid by T.Boone Pickens, statute for
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non is consistent with the positive correlation between the enact-
ment of state statutes and tender offer activity, for as the overall
number of takeovers increases, the probability that anyone state
will be the home of a target, and hence discover the need for a take-
over law, may increase. But this feature of the political process also
suggests a weakness in looking at aggregate takeover activity to ex-
plain legislation: it is the relative size of a target that matters for
legislative attention. Increases in the aggregate number of offers
may not be correlated with the number of takeover bids for major
corporations in various states. Moreover, in the 1980s, the total
number of tender offers has declined but new financing techniques
have permitted hostile takeovers of very large corporations.
The statutes are not, however, as some might intuit, promoted by
a broad coalition of business, labor, and community leaders who
fear that a firm's takeover will have a detrimental effect on the local
economy. While some legislators may be concerned about such an
effect, labor and community groups are not at the forefront in the
attack on takeovers. In fact, the organization most actively involved
in promoting the legislation besides corporate management and
business groups, in nearly all states, is the local bar association.
Although the bar has been involved in drafting legislation in some
states, in others, such as Connecticut, it was deliberately bypassed
by the statute's corporate sponsors, in order to ensure passage of
the legislation without revision. 12 There is no doubt that the corpo-
rate bar's interest can differ from that of managers and sharehold-
ers. 13 For example, corporate lawyers profit from takeover
litigation, and a statute that prevented all hostile takeovers would,
presumably, also eliminate the lawsuits. A factor mitigating the in-
centive for maintaining some modicum of takeover activity is that a
merged firm typically retains the acquiror's legal counsel. Because
foreign resident corporation); Missouri for TWA (hostile bid by Carl Icahn, statute for
foreign resident corporation). In addition, one proposed statute was not enacted in
large part because it was being pushed by a target of a hostile bid at the time: New York
for CBS (hostile bid by Ted Turner). See also Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover
Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365.
12. Connecticut's second second-generation statute, a refinement of the Delaware-
New York type statute, see infra text and accompanying note 16, was also pushed by
management groups. When one legislator testifying at the public hearing voiced qualms
over protecting managers without protecting workers, management became concerned
that their proposal would be defeated and supported a modified bill which included the
proviso that any corporation opting out of coverage of the statute must comply with a
code to be drafted by an appointed commission consisting of legislalOrs and
representatives oflabor and business. The code is anticipated to regulate plant closings
and to provide guidelines for affirmative action and child care programs.
13. See generally Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
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the acquiror and, correspondingly, its counsel are quite often out-
of-state entities, the local bar's interest will be similar to that of in-
cumbent management, in seeking to block takeovers. As we can
conjecture plausible, diverse incentives for corporate lawyers in-
dependent of their clients' interests, we cannot identify a priori what
motivates their behavior.
Perhaps the most important reaction to CTS, and the key to the
resurgence of the federalism debate, is that Delaware, the leading
incorporation state, enacted a second generation statute. To its
credit, Delaware's legislative process was more open and delibera-
tive than that of many other states. Shortly after the CTS decision,
the Delaware Secretary of State requested the executive committee
of the state corporate bar to study adoption of an Indiana-style take-
over statute. The committee initially proposed a modified version
of the Indiana statute, in which a critical difference was an opt-in
rather than opt-out provision. The opt-in approach gives share-
holders, rather than managers, control over the decision to restrict
bids, thereby mitigating the conflict of interest created by a takeover
statute. Following conventional procedure, the committee circu-
lated the proposal to corporate practitioners in Delaware and other
states. After consideration of the responses, several of which criti-
cized the bill for being too favorable to bidders, the proposal was
rejected.
The bar committee produced a second proposal several months
later, which was a modified version of New York's second genera-
tion takeover statute that is more restrictive of bids than Indiana's.
This time the committee did not advance an opt-in approach. Part
of the impetus for the committee's second effort stemmed from the
threat of some Delaware corporations to reincorporate in states that
had second generation statutes if no bill was forthcoming. 14 Dela-
ware feared, rightly or wrongly, that inaction would hurt its preemi-
nence in the incorporation business.
After refinements incorporating solicited responses, the commit-
tee's second proposal was forwarded to the legislature over the op-
position of some committee members. Several commissioners of
the SEC, shareholder organizations and institutional investors,
some of which had voiced objections to the bar committee, actively
opposed the bill in the legislature. At the same time, corporations
14. Delaware Ma)' Staunch Leveraged Takeovers, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, Nov. 23,
1987, at 47; Sontag, "A Takeover Law Grows in Delaware," NAT'L LJ., Apr. II, 1988, at
1.
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also increased their lobbying efforts. I5 Although the Senate major-
ity leader offered an amended bill which featured an opt-in regime,
there was no support for that proposal and the bill passed intact,
with virtually no dissents. The second generation takeover statute is
apparently the first revision to the Delaware corporation code that
was not unanimously endorsed by the corporate bar executive
committee.
Delaware's second generation statute, like its first generation stat-
ute, is considerably less hostile to acquiring firms than the laws of
other states. It provides bidders with greater flexibility to complete
an unfriendly transaction. I6 This is explained, in large part, by the
Delaware corporate bar's representation of a more diverse constitu-
ency, consisting of both targets and bidding firms, than is found in
other states. For instance, large Delaware firms average more acqui-
sitions over their lifetime than large firms incorporated in other
states, and more firms that have undertaken a hostile acquisition are
incorporated in Delaware than in any other state. I7 But because so
many corporations are under Delaware's jurisdiction-approxi-
mately half of the Fortune 500 manufacturing firms and over forty
percent of New York Stock Exchange listed firms-even a compara-
tively mild takeover statute is a matter of serious concern. The en-
actment of a Delaware takeover statute therefore provides
momentum to the movement calling for federal preemption of state
takeover laws. IS Indeed, a California Senate commission on corpo-
rate governance recommended that the state legislature lobby for
preemption to undo the effect of Delaware's statute. 19 The call for
federal action is, however, still not one-sided. To the extent that the
15. Is Delaware About to Harpoon the Sharks?, Bus. WK., Jan. 25, 1988, at 34 (Du Pont
and Hercules Inc. executives phoning legislators); Sontag, supra note 14.
16. For example, the new statute's prohibition period on business combinations is
three years rather than New York's five, and bidders who obtain 85% of the target's
stock in a single transaction are exempt from its coverage. Delaware's threshold
percentage that defines an interested shareholder is, however, lower than New York's, at
15% rather than 20%. Cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (enacted Feb. 2,1988) with N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 912 (McKinney 1986) (enacted in Extraordinary Sess., Dec. 10, 1985).
17. Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1J. L., ECON. AND
ORG. 225, 263 (1985) (comparing number of acquisitions of Fortune 500 companies
incorporated in Delaware and other states); see Romano, supra note 8, at 143 n.83
(discussing database for determining number of hostile bidders in each state).
18. As many commentators noted, the CTS decision would have only limited effect
on the market for corporate control if Delaware did not join the regulatory bandwagon.
See., e.g., Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-takeover Statutes, The Williams Act, The
Commerce Clause and Insider Trading, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 47; Romano, State Takeover Laws:
Constitutional But Dumb, Wall St.]., May 14, 1987, at 28, col. 4.
19. California Legislature Asked to Back Federal Preemption of State Statutes, Corporate
Counsel Weekly (BNA), at 3 Uan. 20, 1988).
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Delaware statute, as some practitioners contend, will have at most
only a minor impact on halting hostile takeovers, the demand for
increased federal regulation of bids will not be abated by Delaware's
action.20
B. When is federal regulation preferable to state regulation?
Economic theories of federalism provide the foundation for advo-
cating that takeover regulation should be shifted to the jurisdiction
of the national government. Analytically, the starting point is the
theoretical justification of the state, that a principal function of gov-
ernment is to correct market failures. Markets fail to allocate re-
sources efficiently when an activity produces externalities or when a
commodity or service is a public good. An activity produces exter-
nal economies or diseconomies-externalities-when it yields bene-
fits or costs to individuals or firms other than the actor, and those
third parties cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits or bear-
ing the costs. When this occurs, because actors only consider the
benefits or costs that directly affect themselves, the socially optimal
level of activity will not be undertaken.
Public goods are closely related to externalities. They are charac-
terized by nonrivalry and nonexcludability in consumption: one in-
dividual's consumption of such a good does not reduce the amount
of the good available to others, and it is impossible or extremely
expensive to exclude any individual from consuming or using the
good. These attributes again create problems for production of the
optimal level of the good by a market mechanism: sellers cannot
exact a price from users since individuals cannot be excluded from
the public good's use, and even if individuals can be excluded (an
impure public good), any market pricing system would be inefficient
since the marginal cost of an additional consumer of a public good
is zero. Correcting the market failure for public goods and external-
ities by government action, however, presents similar informational
20. Some maintain that only private defensive tactics, and in particular, poison pills,
protect target companies; others contend that Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), has effectively eliminated hostile takeovers by
subjecting Delaware targets to auctions supervised by courts, as the high bid in the
auction will be approved by the board. This contention does not imply that the number
of initial bids will be unaffected by the statute; rather, the argument is that given the
existence of a bid, the need to conduct an auction trumps the statute's ability to stop a
hostile bid. Corroborating the view of the inadequacy of the statute is the National
Association of Manufacturers' continued lobbying of Congress for a bill amending the
Williams Act to increase both the waiting period for a tender offer's completion and the
disclosure requirements on purchasers of blocks of stock as to their intentions and
financing sources.
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problems: the users of public goods, like the beneficiaries of an ex-
ternal economy, have no incentive to reveal their true preference for
the good if the revelation will be used to determine their share of a
coerced pricing (taxes) system, just as they have no incentive to vol-
untarily pay for the use of the public good or the external economy.
A public good may be a local public good: the consumption of
such a public good is limited to those in a particular geographic re-
gion. The consumers of a local public good can exercise choice
over its quality and type by choosing their location. If there are
enough jurisdictions and moving is costless, citizens can vote with
their feet and choose the community whose package of public goods
they prefer, thereby simulating a competitive market for the produc-
tion of those goods.21
The economic theory of federalism focuses on the extent of the
externality, or the localness of the public good, to identify which
level of government, if any, is the appropriate one to intervene in a
market. A government should have control over an activity whose
externalities fall completely within its borders, for then the costs
and benefits will accrue solely to the citizens to which that govern-
ment is accountable and the allocation of resources will be effi-
cient.22 When the costs and benefits spill over jurisdictional
boundaries, allocational inefficiencies can arise. For example, a gov-
ernment's regulation may not induce enough of an activity by failing
to count benefits accruing to citizens of other states in addition to its
own citizenry. It might also induce too much of an externality-pro-
ducing activity when the activity benefits its citizens and citizens in
other states bear the costs. In a spillover situation, a higher level
government will contain all benefited and harmed citizens within its
borders and will therefore be the more appropriate authority.
Corporation codes governing the relation between shareholders
and managers share many of the characteristics of local public
goods.23 The reduction in operating costs one corporation receives
21. This is the well-known theory of local public goods developed by Charles
Tieboul. Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local }''xpenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); For a
formal and critical treatment of Tieboul's thesis. see A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ,
LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 519 (1980) (defining local goods as those goods
specific and particular to a geographical location).
22. For a good textbook introduction to the subject, see R. BOADWAY & D. WILDASIN,
PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 497-518 (2d ed. 1984). For an excellent application of this
analytical approach to commerce clause questions, see Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and
Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983).
23. Frank Easterbrook first applied Tiebout's insight to corporate law to argue for
state competition in corporate charters. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. LAw & ECON. 23, 28, 33-35 (1983). Although excludability is possible
because corporations must file with a state for legal recognition, for which the state
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from a particular governance provision does not diminish the cost
savings any other firm obtains from the law. There are many juris-
dictions from which to choose-besides all the states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, each state typically offers a menu of corporation
codes appealing to different types of firms, the most common dis-
tinction being between closely-held and publicly-traded firms, and
the codes' enabling structure permits a corporation to tailor further
its charter to its own taste.24 Mobility costs are low-a firm need
move no physical assets to change its incorporation state. Finally,
jurisdictional spillovers to third parties from the manager-share-
holder contract are unlikely. Where they do occur they can be dealt
with more effectively by other regulatory regimes, such as environ-
mental protection and antitrust statutes, at both the state and fed-
erallevel.
Like all public goods, the provision of corporation codes entails
free rider problems. The cost of lobbying for a specific law is likely
to exceed the benefit to an individual corporation, though not the
aggregate benefit of all firms. The free rider problem, however, ap-
pears to be less important for takeover statutes, as we typically find
one firm more than willing to incur the lobbying expense. For in
the takeover context, the target's management has its livelihood at
stake. The heightened differential calculus for managers consider-
ing hostile takeovers in contrast to other issues of corporation law
highlights another aspect of the collective action problem, evi-
denced by the politics of state takeover laws: the benefits of takeover
statutes are concentrated on local citizens-managers and, arguably,
locally-employed workers of targets, and local businesses and chari-
ties with relations to targets-but the costs are dispersed among
shareholders and bidding firms who typically do not reside in the
legislating state.25 .
At a higher level government, this failure to count all costs and
benefits should not occur because all parties are included within the
charges a fee, this does not eliminate the free rider problem because once incorporated
a firm cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of subsequent code reforms and
judicial decisions interpreting code provisions.
24. This effectively increases the number of jurisdictions beyond a fixed fifty-one.
25. For development of the externality argument with respect to takeover statutes,
see J. G. Sidak & S. Woodward, Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the
Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders (manuscript 1988); see also Langevoort, The Supreme
Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987) (discussion of Supreme Court's allowance of state
regulation).
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jurisdiction.26 But Delaware is also able to internalize many of the
costs and benefits: not only are a larger number of hostile acquirors
incorporated in Delaware than any other state,27 but also, few Dela-
ware corporations are physically present in the state. The very large
number of potential targets in Delaware makes it more worthwhile
for nonresident bidders and shareholders to lobby tn Delaware than
other states, as would be equally true of a national forum. Although
they do not vote in the jurisdiction, their attorneys do.28 Unlike the
national government, however, Delaware is subject to competition
for revenues from other states whose calculations favor enacting
takeover statutes. There is thus an externality, albeit of a different
sort, affecting Delaware politics that would not be present at the na-
tional level, where income from corporate franchise taxes would be
an insignificant factor. In this context of stark shareholder-manager
conflict, state competition may not be for the better.29
Yet it would be a mistake to infer automatically that national regu-
lation would be an improvement. One source of the political market
failure regarding takeover legislation, the organizational difference
between managers and shareholders, is relatively constant across
government level. Managers are easier to coordinate across firms
than shareholders whether the forum is Congress or a state legisla-
ture. Managers already interact through trade associations and po-
sitions on boards,. and they clearly stand to realize substantial
benefits-job protection-from takeover legislation. And, as noted,
when a major firm is the target of a hostile bid, its managers, who
26. This discussion puts to one side the question whether the interest of anyone
other than shareholders should count. For views on this maner, see Romano,
Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform: 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984).
27. A potential asymmetry in legislative influence may offset the importance of
bidder presence: while bidders may lobby against a takeover statute, the threat of
migration because of an unsatisfact.ory outcome is more credible for a target than an
acquiring firm. The text emphasizes absolute and not relative numbers of acquirors in
the state as affecting takeover legislation for two reasons. First, the more bidders
present in absolute number, the more likely it is that someone will reach a legislator's
ear. Second, empirical research indicates that the absolute number of hostile acquirors
and the ratio of the number of hostile bidders to the number of acquirors in the state are
statistically significantly negative predictors of a state's adoption of a second generation
takeover statute but the percentage of hostile acquirors of total domestic corporations is
not. Romano, supra note 8, at 140. The number of hostile bidders incorporated in
Delaware is 7.5% of the total number of New York Stock Exchange firms incorporated
in Delaware, which is the highest percentage so calculated for any state.
28. For example, T. Boone Pickens' counsel, one of the most prominent members of
the Delaware bar, opposed the new t.akeover statute.
29. With respect to corporation code provisions in which the serious conflict of
interest presented by takeovers is absent, the theory and evidence supporting state
chartering is compelling. See Romano, supra note 17; Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
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are far fewer in number than its shareholders, are benefitted by a
takeover statute by more than the lobbying cost, and thus have indi-
vidual incentives to bear the cost of furnishing the collective good-
the statute-to all group members-all managers.30
Just as the benefits of takeover regulation at the national level are
still concentrated, the costs are still diffuse, for shareholders are dis-
persed across the states and most investors' holdings are so small
that the free rider problem is severe. Large shareholders, especially
institutional investors, have more of an incentive to lobby but they
lack some of the organizational advantages available to managers.
Business organizations, such. as trade associations, typically provide
valuable information to their member firms, which induces individ-
ual participation, and have served as the mechanism for manage-
ment's lobbying for takeover statutes.31 Collective action by
shareholders is harder to sustain because they have less need for a
centralized organization to share information. It is well established
that the markets in which the stocks of concern (stock of companies
subject to hostile takeovers) are traded-the national stock ex-
changes-are efficient, such that stock prices include all publicly
available information. There is, accordingly, no benefit for one in-
vestor-especially an institution competing for clients-to share its
private information with all other investors in an umbrella share-
holder organization. Without political entrepreneurs or the group's
production of private goods for its individual members, such as
shared information, collective action is unlikely to succeed.32
30. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 24 (1971) (identifying this
condition of asymmetric costs and benefits across group members for individual
provision of collective good).
31. See, e.g., id. at 144-47; R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 101 (1982). Mancur Olson
contends that successful national organizations like the Chamber of Commerce will have
a federated structure: the local affiliates are small groups for which the collective action
problem is lessened as the members interact on several levels and the sanctions
enforcing participation are therefore greater, as are the rewards in terms of the
provision of selective incentives. Of course, it is local affiliates (the state chambers) that
lobby for state takeover statutes.
32. E.g., R. HARDIN, supra note 31; M. OLSON, supra note 30. Certain shareholder
organizations have just begun to emerge, as discussed infra at text and accompanying
notes 117-19, in response to the problems presented by takeovers, in which information
on voting against management defensive tactics is shared. These organizations were
formed by prototypical political entrepreneurs-a prominent state politician, Jesse
Unruh, Treasurer of California, who managed the state employees' pension funds; and
T. Boone Pickens, a hostile bidder. As a major player in the takeover market, Pickens
has a substantial interest in legislation, which could very well meet Mancur Olson's
condition. See M. OLSON supra note 30 (conditions for an individual's furnishing of a
collective good).
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In addition, there is another important asymmetry affecting the
taking of collective action in the takeover context: individuals are
more likely to coordinate their actions to avoid public "bads" than
to obtain public goods.33 This is because most people are risk
averse-they care more about preventing losses than achieving
gains, of equal dollar magnitude.34 In the takeover context, this
asymmetry favors the lobbying effort of managers over sharehold-
ers, as managers may be harmed by takeovers while target share-
holders profit. Moreover, management typically stands to lose more
than even large shareholders stand to gain, which exacerbates the
collective action problem. Accordingly, an analytical case can be
made for national regulation of corporations in the takeover con-
text, but it is considerably more problematic than at first glance.
II. THE PROBABLE OUTPUT OF FEDERAL ACTION
A. Efforts at federal legislation, 1963-1987.
1. Content of congressional proposals.
An externality analysis of takeover laws suggests that congres-
sional proposals could conceivably differ significantly from the
states' protectionism. The data indicate otherwise. From 1963-
1987, over 200 bills regulating corporate takeovers, excluding bills
directed exclusively at acquisitions of banks, were introduced in
Congress.35 Table 2 breaks down the bills by subject matter. While
33. R. HARDIN, supra note 31, at 82-83, 120-21.
34. Russell Hardin terms this phenomenon "hysteresis." Id. at 82-83.
35. This tally was obtained by reviewing all entries in the subject index of the
Commerce Clearing House's Congressional Index for the 88th through 100th Congresses,
which span the 25 years from 1963 to 1987. The 25-year span was chosen so as to
precede amply the first major legislation on takeovers, the Williams Act enacted in 1968,
and to end immediately prior to the CTS decision. Bills involving banks were excluded
because it would be difficult to unpack the interaction between efforts at changing the
banking regime established by the Glass-Steagall Act and state-federal relations from
regulating takeovers. In the earliest Congresses, for which Table I lists no activity, there
were a few bills concerning acquisitions of federally insured banks. E.g., H.R. 12307,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (providing for notice of change in control of insured banks).
Bills directed at foreign stock or asset acquisitions have been included, even though
these bills may be motivated by xenophobic sentiment unrelated to efforts at regulating
takeovers, because they are most often introduced to stop a hostile takeover in progress.
See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
The tally is in all likelihood inexact. Some bills that do not refer explicitly to
acquisitions may have been offered as a response to a hostile bid. For example, some
revisions in the corporate tax code that are not explicitly connected with the tax
treatment of mergers were inspired by hostile takeovers. For example, the bill, To
Change the Tax Treatment of Partial Liquidations and of Certain Distributions of Appreciated
Property, S. 2687, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. (1982), which does not explicitly refer to takeovers
in the provisions changing the tax treatment of the specified corporate distributions was
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Table 2. Types of Bills.
Gen For

















1979 1 2 2
1980 1
1981 3 4 1 8
1982 1 9
1983 1 1 2 2
1984 14 1 2 8 3 1
1985 22 3 2 5 9
1986 4
1987 24 3 3 5
Key:
Gen TO = regulation of tender offers in general
Air = regulation of acquisitions of airlines
Carr = regulation of acquisitions of carriers
Comm = regulation of communications industry acquisitions
Oil = regulation of petroleum industry acquisitions
Tax = taxation of acquisitions
For Inv = regulation of investments/acquisitions by foreigners
"designed to remove the more blatant provisions of current law which encourage take-.
over activity" which had recently been used in two major acquisitions, U.S. Steel's acqui-
sition of Marathon Oil thwarting Mobil Oil's hostile bid, and Mobil's acquisition of an
Esmark subsidiary. Tax Treatment of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, and of Certain Distri-
butions of Appreciated Property, and Job Training Credit Proposal, Hearing before Sen. Finance
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1982) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Although I could
identify these particular tax proposals, there are undoubtedly other bills, motivated by
takeovers, without an informative legislative history. There may also be noise in the
collection method working in the opposite direction: some bills that have been included,
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most bills (86) involved the regulation of tender offers or mergers in
general, either by amending the Securities Exchange Act or the
Clayton Act, a large number (49) focus on restricting acquisitive ac-
tivity in specified industries only-energy, transportation and com-
munications-industries which are already regulated by Congress.
Another large cluster of bills (49) is concerned with the regulation
of stock and asset acquisitions by foreigners. 36 The final major cate-
gory of bills (28) provides disincentives to takeovers by increasing
the tax on such transactions.
The most striking characteristic of the takeover-related bills is
that, like state statutes, the vast majority aim at making acquisitions
more difficult. The principal approaches to restrict bids are: (1) To
delay the consummation of a bid (which gives management the op-
portunity to implement a defensive strategy to defeat a bid);37 (2) to
increase the costs of an acquisition, particularly for hostile bidders
(which reduces the profitability of engaging in hostile takeovers and
thereby decreases the number of offers that will be made);38 and (3)
more directly, to ban takeovers.39 Some recent bills have imitated
the states by including a federal Indiana-type statute provision, and
a few have specifically protected state regulation from preemption.40
such as bills restricting acquisitions by petroleum companies, may be motivated by anti-
trust concerns and unrelated to a legislative effort to restrict hostile takeovers.
36. This category includes bills directed at foreign investment in general. Bills
regulating foreign investments in petroleum companies were counted as oil industry
rather than foreign investment bills.
37. These take the form of extending the Hart-Scolt-Rodino Act's waiting period for
tender offers; extending the Williams Act's waiting period for tender offers; requiring
federal agency approval of acquisitions in specified industries; and requiring community
impact statements and federal agency review if an acquisition will result in layoffs.
38. These include closing the Williams Act's to-day window during which a bidder
can purchase additional shares before filing the required 13-d statement for 5%
ownership; increasing bidder disclosure obligations; requiring all stock purchases over a
low threshold amount to be by tender offer; prohibiting noncash tender offers; and
prohibiting federally insured banks from holding junk bonds or financing takeovers.
39. In addition to bills proposing bans on all hostile takeovers, some bills propose
banning only hostile takeovers financed by junk bonds. There are also bills proposing
bans limited to all acquisitions in particular industries or all acquisitions by foreign
investors.
40. Bills with an Indiana-type provision are H.R. 2996 and H.R. 2016, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); S. 706, S. 1582 and S. 1882. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1480,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 5914, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Bills with a
provision preserving regulation by states are: S. 1323 and S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); S. 706 and S. 1582, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In addition, one bill, S.
1695, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), would reverse the SEC's effort to overrule a
Delaware Supreme Court decision permitting the defensive tactic of a discriminatory
self-tender, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), in the All-Holders
Release, ReI. No. 33-6653, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1186 Oul. 16, 1986).
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In addition to the substantive tilt against bidders, unlike virtually
all of the state second generation statutes, all of the congressional
bills restricting bids establish mandatory regimes. Firms can neither
opt-out of nor opt-in to these regulatory schemes. Only proposals
limiting management's defensive tactics or copying the Indiana stat-
ute incorporate opt-out features. In short, shareholders would fare
no better, and in all likelihood far worse given the absence of an
opt-out provision, under the vast majority of congressional
proposals.
In the 1980s when the number of congressional bills sharply in-
creased, a set of new ideas, emphasizing regulation of contested
bids only, surfaced in the mix of policy alternatives. As enumerated
in Table 3, thr~ughout the 1980s there are, for the first time, bills
Table 3. Recent Trends in Bill Contents.




1984 4 2 1 2 2 2 13
1985 16 1 1 1 1 7 2 29
1986 0
1987 8 2 1 6 5 22
Total 30 5 2 4 4 15 7 67
Key:
HB = regulation of only hostile takeovers; management-approved
acquisitions excluded
DT = regulation of defensive tactics
GM = regulation of greenmail
BR = regulation of takeovers (bidders affected)
Note: Regulation of greenmail, defensive tactics, and/or hostile bids does
not appear in bills introduced 1963·1980. The bills in those years are of the
bidder regulation (BR) variety.
expressly regulating only hostile acquisitions (30), that is, bills with
provisions exempting bids approved by incumbent managers. This
may be a lag effect, for the number of contested offers appears to
have declined in the 1980s, but some very large firms were the
targets of hostile bids in these years and the classification system for
contested offers of the database used in Table 3 has varied over the
years.41 In addition, in the 1980s, for the first time there are pro-
posals directed at regulating defensive tactics by managers. Most of
41. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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the proposals regulating defensive tactics, however, are coupled
with proposals increasing the regulation of bidders: eleven bills
regulate both defensive tactics and bidder activity while only five
bills restrict exclusively defensive tactics.42 Such packaging creates
the impression that a "level playing field" for takeovers is being
maintained, although one side-incumbent management-may in
fact be helped out far more than the other side. For example, firm
opting-out is allowed for restrictions on incumbent management's
defensive tactics but not for the additional restrictions placed on
bidders.
Another significant characteristic of takeover-related bills is that
similar strategies and permutations of these strategies are repeat-
edly introduced, corroborating earlier research on the congres-
sional decision agenda. In a comprehensive study of policy
initiation, John Kingdon found that successful law reform in the na-
tional arena involves the recombination of old elements rather than
the invention of completely new proposals.43 When Congress has
acted to regulate takeovers in any major way, the recombinant as-
pect of legal change stressed by Kingdon has been a prominent fea-
ture. Senator Williams introduced the first proposal regulating cash
tender offers and requiring disclosure of ownership of stock blocks
in 1965,44 although it was not until 1968 when a modified version,
originating in his 1967 bill, was enacted. The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, which requires premerger no-
tification and waiting periods for certain acquisitions, including cash
tender offers, had first been proposed 20 years earlier.45 It had also
42. Table 3 tabulates proposals restricting greenmail separately because while they
might appear to be limiting defensive tactics, they may also be considered an anti-
takeover measure, as a means to deter bidders from acting in the first place by reducing
their potential return. See generally Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate
Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13 (1985). Greenmail bans are frequently proposed by
management as charter amendments, along with other shark repellent amendments,
conduct which strongly suggests that this is a form of self-paternalism that management
expects will aid it against prospective raiders. Even here, proposals directed against
greenmail are more likely to be tied to other efforts at regulating bidders than to stand
alone, for a ratio of 22 to six (including in the "stand alone" count of six, four bills that
regulate only other defensive tactics along with greenmail).
43. J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PuBLIC POLICIES llH (1984).
Kingdon's database consisted of 247 interviews, conducted over four years, of persons
both inside and outside of government, and 23 case studies of policy initiation and
noninitiation, in the areas of health and transportation policy. [d. at 5.
44. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Unlike the Williams Act, this bill imposed
a prepurchase and waiting period requirement on 10% stock purchases as well as on
cash tender offers.
45. H.R. 9424, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) .
. ;.
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been periodically introduced in succeedingCongresses.46 The new
elements found in bills of the 1980s have now been repeatedly in-
troduced over several Congresses, and they continue the trend of
restricting bidders.47 An educated prediction, accerdingly, is that
any future federal action on takeovers will regulate bidders still
further.
2. The federal political process.
The similarity in prospective legislative output between Congress
and the states suggests that, notwithstanding the externality analy-
sis, the inputs of the politics at the federal level may not be that
different from the states. This is consistent with the earlier sugges-
tion that there would be a collective action problem for sharehold-
ers across all levels of government. To investigate further the input
side of the federal legislative function, Table 1 compares the annual
number of takeover-related bills with time series data related to the
economic and political environment: the level of takeover activity
and of state legislation. It seems plausible that when takeover activ-
ity heats up, national legislators, just like state legislators, are
pressed to act by constituents and the number of bills introduced
rises. While a more accurate variable for measuring an association
between congressional action and takeover activity would be the
dollar value of offers rather than the absolute number of offers, as
we would expect larger targets to attract the attention of more legis-
lators across more states, such a data series is not.available.48 Table
46. E.g., H.R. 2143, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (957); H.R. 7780, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963). As the successful sponsor Rep. Rodino put it, noting the lengthy history,
"premerger notification is an idea whose time has clearly come." Merger Oversight and
H. R. 13131, Providing Premerger Notification and Stay Requirements: Hearings before the
Mon&polies and Commercial Law Subcomm. ofthe HouseJudiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. I
(Mar. 10, 1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
47. Even the new elements are not completely different from proposals in the 1970s;
rather, they more precisely delimit which types of offers are to be restricted, in an
attempt to make takeover regulation more feasible. For example, limiting restrictions to
hostile bids financed by junk bonds improves the regulation's political acceptability,
because it will not affect as much economic activity as a proposal restricting all bids. See
J. KINGDON, supra note 43, at 138 (important criteria for a proposal to reach priority on
the decision agenda are low cost, technical feasibility, and value acceptability).
48. Presumably, the correlation between bills and such a series would be stronger, as
casual empiricism indicates that the time period in which legislative activity
accelerated-the 1980s-is also the period in which the dollar value of bids dramatically
increased, given the number of extremely large targets, while the number of bids did
not. Although there is no complete publicly available time series of the value of
takeovers (or contested offers), Austin began reporting a total dollar value of tender
offers in 1978, M&A began reporting the average value of its merger series in 1979, and
Grimm began reporting the average value of its announced merger series in 1968. The
M&A and Grimm value series do not include all mergers, but only those for which prices
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,1 tabulates instead the number of tender offers and contested
tender offers.
Despite the use of the theoretically less desirable measure, there
is still a statistically significant positive correlation between the
number of tender offers and the number of bills. The Spearman
correlation of .4190 between the number of bills and the number of
offers is significant, although the Pearson correlation of .3016 is
not.49 The correlation between bills and offers suggests that the re-
action of national legislators is not dramatically different from that
of state legislators: when takeover activity increases, legislators in-
crease their efforts at enacting takeover-related legislation. Bearing
this hypothesis out, the number of bills introduced in Congress per
year is even more strongly correlated with the number of state take-
over statutes enacted per year. The Pearson correlation of .6553
and the Spearman correlation of .5180 between the number of bills
and the number of statutes are both significant at the 1 percent
level.,
There is, however, no statistically significant correlation between
the number of contested offers and legislative activity by either level
of government.50 An important reason for the absence of signifi-
cance, in my opinion, involves database limitations. In some years
over ten percent of the offers could not be classified for lack of in-
formation, and another ten percent were excluded from considera-
tion because the bid was withdrawn, although management
resistance could have caused the withdrawal.5l Moreover, there are
problems in the coding of takeovers. In recent years, the database
were available, which tend to be the larger transactions. The Pearson correlation of
.5924 between bills and the Grimm value series was significant but the Pearson
correlations between bills and the M&A value series of .5442 and between bills and the
Austin value series of .4455 were not. It should be noted that the number of offers is
highly correlated with both the Grimm and M&A value series (Pearson correlation of
.8397 with the M&A value series; Pearson correlation of .5188 with the Grimm value
series), but not with the Austin value series (Pearson correlation of .2419). The Austin
value series is, however, highly correlated with 'the number of contested offers (Pearson
correlation of .8869).
49. Again, both measures are reported because the diagnostic plots and W-statistic
for the bills variable indicate that the assumption of normality is questionable.
50. Neither correlatio,n coefficient between the number of bills and the number of
contested offers (Spearman correlation of .3408; Pearson correlation of .3112) nor the
proportion of contested offers (Spearman correlation of .2664; Pearson correlation of
.1283) were significant. This is also true for the states: none of the correlation
coefficients between state enactments per year and contested offers or percent contested
offers were significant.
51. E.g., Austin, supra note I, at 17 (of 222 offers in 1978-1979,47 were eliminated
from the contested-uncontested offer database: 26 could not be classified and 21 bids
had been withdrawn, some because of a successful counter-offer by another bidder).
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classifies as contested only offers management opposes from start to
finish; if management eventually capitulates, an offer is reclassified
as uncontested, although this has not always been the classification
procedure.52 As a result, some auctions, in which the target op-
poses an initial bidder and is acquired by another suitor, may be
classified as uncontested offers. These difficulties indicate that mea-
surement error is far more serious in the contested offers data than
the tender offers data, which would make the detection of a statisti-
cally significant association between contested offers and the
number of bills (or state statutes) more difficult.
One explanation for the weaker correlation between congres-
sional bills and offers compared to that between state statutes and
offers is that Congress could be expected to be slower to respond to
takeover activity than state legislatures, which, we have seen, re-
spond very quickly, compensating when necessary for their part-
time status by calling emergency sessions to consider takeover bills.
Obtaining information about a problem, or coordinating and mobil-
izing support for a solution would be more time-consuming in Con-
gress than in a state legislature: the number of federal legislators is
larger than that of the largest state legislature; there is far greater
diversity in members' interests; and there are more objects of legis-
lation.53 More important, apart from the very largest corporations,
the survival of anyone particular company will be more important
to one or two states, where it has major facilities, than to the nation.
Consequently, because anyone corporation's takeover is important
to only a handful of Senators and Representatives, it would take the
cumulation of many corporate takeovers to persuade enough mem-
bers of Congress of a need for action. Moreover, because target
management is likely both to be sensitive to its relative importance,
and to interact more frequently with local than national legislators,
it in all likelihood invests greater time and effort in obtaining state
rather than federal legislation. Such behavior would contribute to a
congressional lag. Indeed, such a strategy could have a feedback
effect: increasing success at the state level can reduce further the
effort expended at the national level.
52. Austin, Nigem & Bernard, supra note I, at 5 J. In earlier years, offers were
classified as contested as long as management was opposed to the offer at some point in
time, even if management ultimately accepted the bid. Austin & Mandula, supra note I,
at 56.
53. For some suggestions concerning why congressional logrolling has not mitigated
at least some of these problems and produced more legislation see infra text and notes
82-86.
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The intuition concerning a slower congressional reaction is sup-
ported both by anecdotes and statistical data. Although many state
legislatures have been mobilized to enact protective takeover stat-
utes immediately upon the appearance of a hostile bid, congres-
sional hearings on bills responding to hostile attempts often take
place after the bid's outcome has been decided.54 In addition, there
is a statistically significant positive correlation between the number
of congressional bills and lagged variables for the number of tender
offers and contested offers.55 While there is also a significant posi-
tive correlation between the number of state statutes and lagged
tender offers, but not between state statutes and lagged contested
offers,56 the correlation between state laws and contemporaneous
tender offers is much stronger. This bolsters the conclusion that
Congress is slower to react than state legislators. Further evidence
of a lag in congressional reaction can be found in the awareness of
members of Congress of a timeliness problem, as indicated by the
inclusion of retroactive provisions in bills to ensure particular bids
will be covered, or reopened, should the bidder successfully com-
54. Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania introduced legislation to stop T. Boone
Pickens' takeover of Gulf Oil of Pennsylvania, S. 2447 and S. 2448, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984), and at the time of the hearings Gulf had agreed to merge with a White Knight.
See Tender Offer Practices and Corporate Director Responsibiliiies: Hearing on S. 2448 and S. 2797
before Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Specter). Rep. William Coyne of Pennsylvania reintroduced a bill
requiring community impact statements, H.R. 960, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985), after
the Gulf-SOCAL merger conclusion of T. Boone Pickens' takeover attempt, which was
the subject of his testimony at a hearing on efforts at restricting takeovers. Tax Aspects of
Acquisitions and Mergers, Hearings before Oversight Subcomm. and Select Revenue Measures
Subcomm. of House Ways and Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 819 (1985) (statement of
Rep. Coyne). The takeover-related corporate tax proposals mentioned in the text and
accompanying note 35; supra were debated and enacted after the completion of the
acquisitions that inspired them. Congressional hearings have been convened in the
midst of a hostile bid, see infra note 62 (citing hearings), but none of those hearings
produced any contemporaneous legislation.
55. Both the Pearson correlation of .3862 between bills and offers lagged by one-
year and the Spearman correlation of .3720 are significant. The Spearman correlation
of .5125 between bills and contested offers lagged by one-year is significant, although
the Pearson correlation of .2498 is not.
56. The Pearson and Spearman correlations between the number of new state laws
and the number of tender offers lagged by one year are, respectively, .5190 and .5743.
Both correlations are significant at less than 5%. The Pearson correlation between state
laws and contested offers lagged by one-year is negative and insignificant; the Spearman
correlation is positive and insignificant. I have no good explanation for why Congress
would be more sensitive to the level of contested offers than the states, that is, for why
the number of statutes is not correlated with the contemporaneous or lagged number of
contested offers while the number of bills is correlated with the lagged contested offers
series.
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plete its offer before enactment, provisions that are rarely used in
bills proposing state takeover laws.57
Congressional activity also appears to be related to the constitu-
tional status of state regulation. In the years between MITE and
CTS when the constitutionality of state statutes was in doubt, the
number of congressional bills soars. Several bills, as noted earlier,
explicitly include a provision preserving the right of states to regu-
late takeovers. The proposed relation can be tested by examining
the difference between the mean number of bills introduced in the
two different time periods to determine whether they come from the
same population. The difference in means (twenty-one bills in
1982-1987 compared to five in 1963-1981) is significant at the five
percent level. Of course, this difference is also related to changes in
underlying economic factors affecting acquisitive transactions across
the two time periods.58 The difference in means between the
number of tender offers before and after MITE (124 offers in 1982-
1987 compared to seventy-three offers in 1963-1981) is also signifi-
cant at five percent. It is impossible to isolate the magnitude of the
effect on the increased number of offers of the underlying uncer-
tainty over the constitutionality of state regulation, for the two vari-
ables are, in all likelihood interrelated: acquirors may increase their
activity when states' ability to regulate is in doubt. Congressional
behavior is correspondingly most reasonably described as a function
of both the constitutional status of state regulation and the level of
takeover activity.
57. See, e.g., H.R. 5452 and H.R. 5135, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced Apr.
12 and Mar. 14, respectively, but made retroactive to Jan. 1 to cover divestiture of
refineries from Texaco-Getty merger); To Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Hearings
on S. 1373 before the Sen. Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 97-98 (1969) (statement
of Howard C. Westwood, Counsel to Western Air Lines) (proposed statute retroactive
to bill introduction date, March 7, to be applicable to Western Air Lines' hostile
acquirer, Kirk Kerkorian, because he had not exercised control in the form of voting his
shares as of March 7). There is an interesting parallel to this strategy in Delaware's
second generation takeover statute which further supports the contention that Delaware
and the national government have similar political processes for the production of
corporate laws. While most other states' second generation takeover statutes are either
effective immediately upon enactment or prospectively, Delaware's is not. Recognizing
the more deliberative process that would be undertaken, the Delaware bill included a
retroactive provision, to a date prior to its legislative introduction, which protected
Boeing, a prime advocate of the legislation, against a potential takeover by T. Boone
Pickens.
58. For example, business conditions in the 1980s were favorable to acquisitions,
quite apart from the uncertain status of state regulation: there was a booming stock
market and a new definition of market share under the federal merger guidelines that
expanded the number of possible corporate marriages. Dept. ofJustice, Antitrust Div.,
Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982).
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Table 4. Regressions of Bill Introductions, 1963-1987.
1. Bills - 1.7~94 - 0.0245 Offers + 0.0497 Offerslag +
(.4~1) (-.370) (.883)




F = 3.775* DW = 2.633
R2 = .5261 R2 (adjusted) - .3868
2. Bills - 4.5947 - 0.0419 Offers + 1.6132 Statutes +
(1.447) (- .970) (2.369)*
+ 10.5301 MiteDummy
(2.343)*
F = 5.556* DW = 2.213
R2 = .4546 R2 (adjusted) = .3728
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at less than 5 percent
Accordingly, I estimated a multiple regression model that treats
the number of bills introduced in Congress as a function of takeover
activity, state regulatory activity, and the constitutional status of
state action. Two estimated equations and related statistics are re-
ported in Table 4; one includes lagged variables for the number of
one includes lagged variables for the number of offers and state stat-
utes enacted per year to reflect the slower reaction of Congress and
the other does not. The explanatory variables included in both
equations are the number of offers, the number of statutes and a
dummy variable for the constitutionality issue, that distinguishes be-
tween years before and after the MITE decision.59 The regression
59. The contested offers variable was not included because its shorter time series
would too substantially reduce the number of observations. No adjustments were made
to the ordinary least squares estimation method because the problem of autocorrelation
that often occurs with time-series data does not appear to be a factor: the Durbin-
Watson (D-W) statistic of2.633, reported in Table 4, indicates that there is no positive
serial correlation present but is indeterminant concerning negative serial correlation.
The D-W statistic of 2.213 in the regression model excluding the lagged variables
indicates no serial correlation, positive or negative. Moreover, although the bills
variable does not appear to be normally distributed, normal distribution tests for the
regression residuals could not be rejected. Because the number of state laws, while
exogenous to Congress, is really an endogenous variable, I also estimated several two-
stage least squares models, which take the simultaneity of the variables into account. In
the first stage the number of state statutes was regressed on a combination of the
number of offers, lagged offers and the MITE dummy. The residuals were then used to
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results are similar. As indicated by the R2 statistics, both regressions
explain close to forty percent of the variation in the number of bills.
The hypothesis that the independent variables taken together have
no effect on the number of bills can be rejected, given the statistical
significance of both regressions' F-statistics. In fact, ajoint hypothe-
sis test in the full model (equation 1) that the coefficients of both
lagged variables are equal to zero, that is, that they have no explana-
tory power, could not be rejected (F = 1.4086). This suggests that
the simpler model (equation 2) is preferable. The only explanatory
variable that is statistically significant is the number of state statutes;
but when the lagged variables are omitted, the dummy variable for
MITE is also statistically significantly positive. Although the insig-
nificance of the number of offers as an explanatory variable might
be a function of its positive association with the number of statutes,
tests for multicollinearity were not significant.60 The significant
positive sign of the coefficient on the number of statutes supports
the view that the political process affecting Congress and the states
. is similar: when the number of new state takeover laws rises so does
the number of bills introduced in Congress.
The most important evidence of the common political process for
congressional bill introductions and state enactments is that the
principal factor motivating political action at the state level-the
presence of a large-sized target firm in the state61-also appears to
be the primary impetus for congressional interest in regulating take-
overs. The years of hotly-contested battles involving major corpora-
tions-the 1980s battles over Phillips Petroleum (1985), Gulf Oil
(1984), TWA (1985), and Marathon Oil (1981)-are years of high
congressional bill activity. Many of the· battles, as well as earlier
contests, were the subject of congressional hearings, often held
estimate bills, with various combinations of statutes lagged and the MITE dummy when
it was not used in the first stage. Each equation overall was significant (the F-statistic
ranged from 4.881 to 9.341) although the R2 and adjusted R2 values were less than .33
and none of the explanatory variables were individually significant in explaining the
number of bills, nor in explaining state statutes in the first stage regression. This
technique is still crude, however, because the number of offers should not be treated as
exogenous. I did not estimate a three-stage process that would treat offers as
endogenous because of the lack of an appropriate instrumental variable for the number
of offers.
60. The preferred test for multicollinearity-the singular-value decomposition test-
did not evince collinearity, although the simplest tests indicate collinearity--offers.
lagged offers and lagged statutes. when separately regressed on all other explanatory
variables. had relatively high R 2 values (R2 greater than .6). See D. BELSLEY, E. KUH & R.
WELSCH, REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 85-113 (1980). Multicollinearity is not a factor.
under either set of tests, in the regression model that excludes the lagged variables.
61. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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without any consideration of a bill.62 Furthermore, these and other
takeovers of large corporations explicitly motivated Senators and
Representatives from the state where the target was located to pro-
mote legislation. Besides spurring the introduction of legislation,
takeovers of local firms prompt members of Congress to testify in
support of other members' bills and to continue to introduce, cos-
ponsor and testify in support of takeover regulation in subsequent
sessions after the outcome of their local problem has been re-
solved.63 This evidence lessens the significance of the lack of ex-
planatory power of the number of offers in the regressions for the
number of bills and of the weak correlation between those two vari-
ables: to the extent that a subcategory of takeover bids attract con-
gressional attention, the total number of takeovers is irrelevant.
Examples of congressional activity motivated. by local takeover
battles are legion. Senators and Representatives from Oklahoma in-
troduced legislation banning hostile takeovers of energy companies
'and punitively taxing greenmail payments as a consequence of T.
Boone Pickens' attempt to take over Phillips Petroleum, headquar-
tered in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, that ended in a greenmail payment
62. E.g., FCC Network Acquisition Approval Act of 1985: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (CBS takeover, S.
1312); Hearing before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (TWA takeover); Hearing before House Comm. on
Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Mobil-Marathon takeover); Hearing
on H.R. 4930 before Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels of the House Comm. on Energy and
. Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Proposed Purchase of Marathon Oil Co. by Mobil Oil
Co.:Joint Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); E.ffects of Proposed Canadian
Pacific Acquisition of Hobart Corp.: Hearing before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); Proposed Tender Offer to the Copperweld Corp. by Societe Imetal: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (hearings held in Pennsylvania and Ohio, sites of Copperweld plants)
[hereinafter cited as Hearing on Copperweld Takeover]; Market Performance and Competition in
the Petroleum Industry: Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Integrated Oil Operations of the
Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Burmah Oil
acquisition of Signal Oil); Standard Oil Co. of Indiana-Occidental Petroleum Corp. Merger:
Hearing before the Special Subcomm. on Integrated Oil Operations of the Sen. Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearing To Amend the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, supra note 57 (controlling stock block purchases of Western Airlines by Kirk
Kerkorian and of Pan American by Resorts International).
63. E.g., Tax Aspects of Acquisitions and, Mergers: Hearings before the Oversight and Select
Revenue Measures Subcomms. of the House Ways and Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 595
(1985) (statement of Rep. Bonker of Wash. in support ofH.R. 1100 banningjunk bonds
and greenmail, referring to then active hostile takeover attempt by Sir Oliver Goldsmith
of major Washington employer, Crown Zellerbach). Senators Boren, Nickles and
Metzenbaum, and Representatives Brooks aild Seiberling, among others, have
continued to sponsor and testify in favor of takeover-related bills ever since their initial
efforts instigated by local contests. It should be noted, however, that some of their
states, such as Ohio, have also continued to be the home of targets of hostile bids.
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to Pickens.64 Pickens' attempt to take over Gulf Oil, headquartered
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, inspired several takeover-related bills
by members of the Pennsylvania delegations of the House and Sen-
ate as well.65 Similarly, Mobil Oil's battle for Marathon Oil, the pri-
mary employer in Findlay, Ohio, was the source of numerous bills
from Senators and Representatives ofOhio.66 Members of the Kan-
sas delegations in the Senate and House introduced, cosponsored
and testified in favor of several proposals to restrict energy company
mergers and acquisitions, in an effort to prevent the Texaco take-
over of Getty, whose success required the divestiture of a major re-
fining plant in EI Dorado, Kansas.67 Other members sponsored
legislation restricting gas pipeline acquisitions because of a takeover
of a major Kansas pipeline by an investment bank.68 The Senators
from Missouri introduced legislation restricting hostile airline acqui-
sitions as a result of Carl kahn's attempt to take over TWA, a major
employer in Missouri.69 Representative Jack Brooks of Texas intro-
64. S. 473, 476 and 420, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Sens. Boren and Nickles of
Okla.); H.R. 1003 and 1100, id. (Reps. Jones, Edwards, English and McCurdy of Okla.);
H.R. 998, id. (Rep. Edwards). See Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions in General, Hearing bifore
the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1985) (statement of Sen. Nickles that
the Senate bills were in response to the Phillips Petroleum takeover bid).
65. E.g., H.R. 5374, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Rep. Coyne), see Coyne testimony,
supra note 54 concerning origin of bill; S. 2447 and 2448, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(Sen. Specter), see STAFF OF SENATE FINANCE COMM. 98TH CONG, 2D SESS., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS IN OIL AND GAS COMPANY MERGERS AND ACQ.U1SITIONS, 4
(Comm. Print 1984) (statement of Sen. Specter on origin of bills).
66. E.g., S. 1926 and 1927, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Sen. Metzenbaum of Ohio);
H.R. 4930 and 5274, id. (Rep. Brown of Ohio); H.R. 4409, id. (Rep. Seiberling of Ohio).
Other congressional delegation members testified at the Mobil-Marathon acquisition
hearings cited supra in note 62.
67. S. 2589, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Sen Kassebaum of Kan.); Oil Industry
Mergers: Hearings bifore the Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels and the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984) (statement of Rep. Whittaker of Kan. in support of H.R.
5452). H.R. 5452 and H.R. 5153, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Rep. Florio ofNJ.) were
introduced with a similar purpose: the Texaco-Getty merger was going to result in
closing a New Jersey refinery.
68. H.R. 4095, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Reps. Slattery and Glickman of Kan.);
see Gas Pipeline Mergers: Hearing bifore the Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels, House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
69. S. 1218, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Sens. Danforth and Eagleton of Mo.); S.
1267, id. (Sen. Eagleton); see International Air Transportation Protection Act of 1985: Hearing
on S. 1218 bifore the Aviation Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) (statement of Sen. Danforth that Icahn
takeover of TWA was reason for bill). TWA's hub is the St. Louis Airport. TWA has a
history of congressional protectors. Rep. Bosco of California introduced legislation to
prohibit an airline operating under Chapter XI of the federal bankruptcy law from
acquiring another airline in response to Texas Air Corporation's proposed acquisition
ofTWA, although his object may have been more to punish Texas Air than to help TWA.
H.R. 2870, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). When he was a state legislator in California in
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duced legislation to enforce uniform margin requirements against
foreign investors when he was "alerted to the inequity in the stock
purchase margin requirements by the experience of the Zale Corp.,
a Texas-based corporation with offices throughout Texas that
was threatened with a takeover by a Canadian company "70 Ca-
nadian Dome Petroleum's takeover of Conoco inspired similar bills
by Senators and Representatives of the affected states.71 The entire
North Carolina delegation in the House sponsored a bill to ban hos-
tile takeovers by foreign persons either financed by debt or made for
cash if the bidder did not have all the cash in possession, to thwart
the hostile takeover of a m<tior North Carolina company, Burlington
Industries, by a Canadian 'firm, Dominion Textile.72 At the same
time the North Carolina legislature passed three statutes for
Burlington.73
Further support of the connection between specific hostile bids
and congressional bill sponsorship is provided by a study of Senate
bills introduced in 1984-1987 by Kenneth Lehn and James Jones.
They found a statistically significant positive relation between the
probability of a Senator introducing a bill regulating takeovers and
the presence of the target ofa hostile bid in his or her state.74 Their
finding strongly corroborates the anecdotal evidence indicating that
the politics operating at the national and state levels are quite simi-
lar. In addition, the anecdotal evidence provides the direct institu-
tionallink with which to interpret Lehn and Jones' aggregate result:
management of targets, invoking the specter of local employment
devastation, contact their Senators and Representatives for assist-
1981, Rep. Bosco had sponsored state legislation to aid Continental Airlines in its effort
to fight off a takeover by Texas Air, then called Texas International. Texas Air
apparently promised legislators that it would not move Continental's headquarters from
California to Texas nor fire many employees and Bosco's bill was not adopted. Two
years later, Texas Air moved the headquarters. Government Policies on the Transfer of
Operating Rights Granted by the Federal Government, Particularly Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity and Airport Slots: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1985) (statement of Rep.
Bosco).
70. Acquisition of U. S. Companies by Foreign Nationals: Hearings on H. R. 1294 before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1981) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
71. S. 1429 and S. 1436, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sen. Kassebaum of Kan.); Extension of
Margin Requirements to Foreign Investors, Hearings on S. 1429 and S. 1436 before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong.• 1st Sess. 3-
4 (1981) (statement of Sen. Nickles of Okla. supporting bills).
72. H.R. 2514, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
73. North Carolina Legislature Responds to Attempted Takeover of Burlington, Sec. Reg. &
Law Rep. (BNA) 829 Oune 5, 1987).
74. K. Lehn andJ.W.Jones, The Legislative Politics of Hostile Corporate Takeovers
(manuscript 1987).
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ance. But as in the politics of state statutes, labor unions have not
been extremely active in the congressional politics. As tabulated in
Table 5, in seventy-seven congressional hearings on takeover bills
Table 5. Witnesses at Takeover Hearings.
Witness No. Hearings (%).
Federal Govt.+ 62 (81)
Target Management 46 (60)
Academic 37 (48)
Member of Congress 32 (42)
State or Local Govt. 23 (30)
Union Member 19 (25)
Acquiror/Raider 15 (20)
Investment Bank 15 (20)
Stock Exchange 4 (5)
Shareholder Org. 2 (3)
• Of 77 hearings on takeover-related legislation or particular bids held
from 1963 to 1987, the number with at least one witness of specified
type.
+ Executive branch/agency official or employee.
or particular hostile bids held during 1963-1987, while forty-six had
at least one target manager as a witness, only nineteen had a union
representative or member as a witness.75 Table 5 also highlights the
prevalence of the collective action problem for investors as a source
of the one-sidedness in congressional proposals: shareholders are
the one group affected by takeovers that is nearly always absent
from the witness roster, having participated in only two hearings. It
is, of course, possible that other witnesses, such as raiders (present
at 15 hearings), academics (37), investment banks (15), or govern-
ment agencies (62), are advocates, at least in part, of shareholders'
interests.
3. Behavioral explanations.
Despite all this congressional activity, hearings and takeover-re-
lated bills rarely result in legislation. This is consistent with re-
search findings that the subjects of congressional hearings and
75. The only unions that appear to be active in this context are airline unions, which
testified at the hearings called on Carl Icahn's bid for TWA, supra notes 62 and 69, and
have been lobbying to have revived and strengthened job protection provisions, as were
imposed on airline mergers, friendly or hostile, in the days of regulation. See Airline
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Question of Labor Protection: Hearing before Aviation Subcomm. of
the Sen. Commerce, Science, and Transportation Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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reports do not rank v~ry high as priority agenda items. 76 One might
therefore wond~r why members of Congress engage so frequently
in activity which appears altogether futile, and why target managers
even bother with the federal route? From the congressional mem-
bers' perspective, holding hearings and introducing bills on take-
overs are equivalent to participating in roll call votes, performing
casework, and making home appearances and speeches. These ac-
tivities are forms of congressional "advertising, credit-claiming, and
position-taking," which are important for reelection because they
identify the incumbent with particularized benefits to constituents
and popular messages associated with little issue content or contro-
versy." It is thus not surprising that, as Table 5 shows, many hear-
ings have Senators and Representatives among the witnesses. Also
consistent with this credit-claiming explanation of congressional ac-
tivity is the bipartisan politics. As in state legislatures, in Congress
state congressional delegations virtually unanimously support an in-
dividual member's takeover-related proposal.
The congressional politics on takeovers shares features· with a
particular form of constituent service that has been termed the "fire
alarm" approach to executive branch oversight. In this approach,
Congress does not sniff out fires itself but instead responds to con-
stituents' pulling of the fire alarm box.7s By calling or participating
in a hearing on a takeover, members of Congress can receive credit
for responding to a constituent's problem, while the constituent has
borne the cost of informing the member. But despite the structural
similarity, the member's efforts typically do not eliminate the cause
of the constituent's complaint in this context. The low rate of actual
legislation makes the benefit to managers from lobbying, and, by
implication, the actual credit a member of Congress can receive, dif-
ficult to identify. However, the expenditures involved in seeking
federal action are negligible. Managers may simply believe it worth
76. J. KINGDON, supra note 43, at 231-32.
77. D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 49-73 (1974). An excellent
example is the hearing on Societe Imetal's hostile takeover of Copperweld held in
Pennsylvania during the battle, at which five congressmen were present: "It was only last
Thursday that any of us in Congress realized the seriousness of Imetal to take over
Copperweld. Since that time Congressman Dent, Congressman Gaydos and the
subcommittee have been extremely swift and deliberate in their actions. I want also to
thank Congressmen Murtha and Carney for taking this important step.... on Friday last
I contacted the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department, demanding an investigation and saying, as I do believe, that this
measure would violate the antitrust statutes and would minimize competition." Hearing
on Copperweld Takeover, supra note 62, at 7 (statement of Rep. Heinz).
78. See McCubbins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus
Fire Alanns, 2 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
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while to cover all bases, given the large poteritialloss they face from
a successful hostile takeover, and when the cons~itutionalityof state
laws became more uncertain after MITE it was all the more impor-
tant to engage iri such activity. It also appears that a congressional
hearing has benefits besides the production of legislation: it may de-
lay the outcome of a bid, which is a tactic that sometimes enables
management to thwart a hostile offer.79 In addition, even if the
credit received is scant, the cost to the member of Congress of ser-
vice (introducing a bill or holding a hearing) is small, while the cost
of inaction is potentially large (loss of support of not only the con-
stituent firm but also of the rest of the local business community),
This analysis is not meant to suggest that congressional efforts at
takeover legislation are uniformly perceived as futile or insincere
gestures. Members of Congress do not necessarily intend all of
their takeover-related action to be symbolic, and, of course, federal
takeover legislation has periodically been enacted. One proxy of in-
tention is the form the proposed legislation takes, given the many
options for regulation in the takeover area. For while a Senator or
Representative's support for a particular bill undoubtedly entails a
decision concerning a preferred regulatory strategy, the different
forms of regulation come under the jurisdiction of different commit-
tees. Consequently, the legislator can adapt the regulatory ap-
proach to maximize his or her institutional influence by drafting' a
bill that will be forwarded to a committee on which he or she serves.
. There is some empirical support for this speculation. Slightly
under two-thirds (sixty-two percent) of takeover-related bills were
introduced by individuals who were members of the committee to
which the bill was referred; of the remainder, thirteen percent were
sponsored by individuals who, in the same session, introduced at
least one other takeover-related bill that went to a committee on
which they served.so While we might expect the preferences of
79. E.g., Hearing on CopptmlJeld Takeouf':r, supra note 62, at 25 (statement of Phillip H.
Smith, President and Chairman of Copperwe1d) (thanking Congressmen present and
stating "ifit hadn't been for you and the prompt response we got from you this company
would have been taken over yesterday which was the run-out date for the first tender
offer").
80. Seven bills were referred to two committees; in five of these cases, the sponsor
was a member of one of the committees. In a random sample of bill introductions, in
both houses in 1965, 1975 and 1985, 52% of the bills introduced were referred to a
committee of which the sponsor was a member. In this sample, 12 bills were referred to
two committees; of these, seven were introduced by a member of one of the relevant
committees. The ratio of bills for which the sponsor was a member of the committee of
jurisdiction .to those for which the sponsor was not a member is 1.61 for the takeover
bills and 1.10 for the random sample of bills. To see whether this difference is
statistically significant, I computed the chi-square statistic for the contingency table of
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committee members, to differ from those of the whole house, the
content of takeover-related bills does not vary with the sponsor's
membership. Moreover, the takeover bills of committee chairmen,
which presumably have a greater likelihood of passage given the in-
stitutional organization of Congress,8l do not differ in kind from
those directed to the committee that are introduced by committee
members and nonmembers.
The data do raise a potentially puzzling question: why, particu-
larly given the venerable congressional institution of logrolling, and
the increasing pressure for federal action in the 1980s after MITE,
was no general takeover legislation enacted?82 To frame the ques-
tion more broadly, the persistence of policy alternatives on the deci-
sion agenda raises the question when does an idea become one
"whose time has come?" To state the obvious, there is no theory
powerful enough to predict political change. Cognizant of this ca-
veat, researchers of congressional decision-making have nonethe-
less identified as important variables in the timing of reform: (1)
changes in presidential administration; (2) changes in the composi-
tion of Congress; and (3) shifts in national mood.83
sponsor committee membership and bills. Its value of 3.78 just fails to be significant at
the 5% level (the tabulated chi-square is 3.84). This means that by conventional
statistical standards we cannot dismiss the possibility that the difference in rate of
sponsorship by a committee member across the groups of bills is a matter of chance.
However, we do expect that members of Congress are more likely to introduce bills that
go to committees on which they sit, as the choice of committee is not random. See e.g.,
Rohde & Shepsle, Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic
Aspects of a Social Choice Process, 67 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 889 (1973).
81. See Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power, 2J.L., ECON., & ORG. 33 (1986); Weingast & Marshall, The Industrial Organization
of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON.
132 (1988).
82. We must be careful to acknowledge, however, that an important takeover statute
was actually adopted during this time period-the tax reform act of 1986 ended a
longstanding corporate tax provision that allowed appreciated properties to be
distributed to shareholders without being subjected to the corporate level tax, and had
been used profitably in hostile takeovers. Moreover, the principal loophole blunting the
effect of the 1986 Act, exemption for so-called "mirror liquidation" transactions, was
closed in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. While the reform will
probably have a significant effect on all acquisitions, friendly and hostile, and may have a
perverse, unintended effect of restricting management's ability to respond to a hostile
bid by remaining independent, most practitioners and commentators view a general
regulatory statute, along the lines of the Williams Act, as the more critical reform issue.
83. J. KINGDON, supra note 43, at 176. Examples of changes in government actors
producing legislation that had been in the policy hopper for some time are airline
deregulation, promoted by the newly-elected Carter Administration, and Great Society
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, adopted after Lyndon Johnson's election
which increased the number of liberal democrats in the House. Id. at 161, 175.
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The principal reason why the substantial constituent pressure in
the 1980s for federal action on takeovers did not produce major leg-
islation is, in my estimation, that one of the most important players,
the Reagan administration, was opposed to it.84 The SEC Chairman
throughout the period, John Shad, was a vigorous proponent of the
Administration's position in favor of a deregulated market. Agency
heads are quite important in successful policy initiation,85 and the
takeover field has been no exception. The Williams Act was vigor-
ously supported by then SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen, just as the
Carter Administration's Justice Department enthusiastically sup-
ported the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. This fact no doubt goes some
way in explaining the popularity of federal government personnel as
witnesses in the takeover-related hearings, for without agency sup-
port, congressional policy objectives can be undermined by their in-
adequate or unenthusiastic implementation.
With the relevant regulatory agency and the President opposed,
production of a takeover statute would dearly have been viewed by
most members of Congress as a losing proposition, making efforts
at logrolling unlikely to be pursued. A new administration may, cor-
respondingly, present a window of opportunity for those advocating
further legislative action on hostile takeovers. For instance, the
Democratic presidential candidate, Michael Dukakis, apparently
wants to "control the merger and acquisition binge."86 In addition,
Nicholas Brady, a trusted advisor of the Republican candidate,
George Bush, has advocated increased regulation of takeovers,87
and the new SEC Chairman David Ruder is much more favorably
disposed to regulation than Chairman Shad.88 However, there are
important institutional features of the Presidency that temper pre- I
dieted change in policy from the 1988 election: unlike members of
Congress, the President is elected by and represents all citizens and
is thereby considered to be more removed from pork barrel poli-
tics.89 The Reagan Administration's opposition to takeover regula-
tion could be an instance of the operation of this institutional factor.
84. E.g., COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANNUAL REPORT, 187-216 (1985) printed
with ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1985).
85. J. KINGDON, supra note 43.
86. The Dukakis Candidacy, Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1988, at 30. col. 1.
87. See Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers: Hearing on S. 420, S. 476, and S. 632 before
Taxation and Debt Management Subcomm. ofSenate Finance Comm, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (April
22, 1985) [hereinafter Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers].
88. Gigot, Reaganite Regret: SEC Chief[sJust a Regulator Guy, Wall St.J.,July 8, 1988, at
12, col. 3.
89. For an excellent review of the political science literature endorsing this view of
the presidency see Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms
of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1603-07 (1988).
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B. Public Opinion on Takeovers: the Saliency of the Issue.
An important background factor that can strengthen the executive
branch's resistance to congressional pork barrel on takeover legisla-
tion is the third factor appearing in the policy initiation literature,
national mood. A conventional measure of national mood is public
opinion polls.90 In a comprehensive study of public opinion toward
business and government, Seymour Lipset and William Schneider
found two principal themes that were persistent over time and that
provide a helpful context for interpreting public opinion on take-
overs.91 First, the public is distrustful of bigness in general, both in
business and in government. For example, the public is uniformly
more supportive of business, and more hostile toward government
regulation, when questions refer to "small business" or "business",
rather than "big business."92 Similarly, the public expresses a de-
creasing degree of confidence in government as its size increases
from iocal, to state, to federal.93 Second, the public consistently ex-
presses satisfaction with current levels of regulation, desiring
neither to expand nor contract it. However, while the public gener-
ally opposes changing the level of regulation, there is more support
for increasing regulation when the purpose is consumer protection
(which includes regulation to prevent firms from charging higher
prices or from polluting), than when the regulatory object is "telling
people how to run their business."94
Attitudes toward takeovers are stable not only across polls, but
also over time and across different classes of respondents. Tables 6-
12 tabulate responses to questions concerning corporate· takeovers
and mergers included in public opinion polls over the past twenty-
five years.95 Given the constancy in responses over the polls, public
90. Kingdon did not find public opinion poll data particularly useful in his study of
national policymaking as polls did not provide direct information on the decision
agenda issues of interest to him. J. KINGDON, supra note 43, at 231.
91. S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND (rev. ed. 1987).
92. [d. at 81-88, 168, 240, 255-56.
93. [d. at 82-83.
94. [d. at 237, 245-48.
95. The discussion in the text draws on 24 polls. The appendix provides the polling
organization, polling beginning and ending dates, interview method, and sample size,
for each poll. Twenty-three of the polls were located through a computer search of the
poll database of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of
Connecticut and the American Public Opinion Index. I obtained separately a poll
commissioned in 1988 by the Coalition to Stop the Raid Against America from Steven
Wallman, their counsel. He forwarded the results to me independently of my research
on this paper, and he graciously permitted me to include it in this discussion. The
earliest poll I found through the Roper Center was a 1954 poll by the Opinion Research
Corporation. the rest of the polls were conducted after 1980. The sampling errors of
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opinion on takeovers can be summarized at the outset as follows: (1)
a majority of the public is indifferent to, and at best casually in-
formed about, takeovers; (2) a decisive plurality, and sometimes a
majority, of the public has a negative opinion of takeovers; and (3)
the public identifies shareholders and executives as winners, and
workers as losers, in takeovers.
The first important finding, then, is that the public's judgment of
takeovers is based on quite limited information and interest. Table
6 tabulates responses to questions concerning how informed re-
spondents consider themselves to be on takeovers. Well over three-
quarters of respondents express little knowledge of, or interest in,
news on takeovers.96 Of itself, this phenomenon is not particularly
unusual. It is highly plausible that for most members of the public it
is not cost justified to expend much effort at obtaining information
about corporate takeovers, for takeovers are unlikely to be an issue
of importance to them.97 Moreover, even when the stakes are far
higher in general elections, citizens need not be informed to vote
their interest: they may be able to use political party labels as a
proxy for determining which candidate to support,98 or they may be
able to infer from the preferences of the informed how they, the
uninformed, should vote.99 But the public's limited knowledge and
interest in takeovers surely explains why in all of the polls, a sizeable
proportion of respondents either choose answers indicating indiffer-
ence to mergers and their effects or choose none of the offered
responses.
A question asking respondents to "describe their feelings when
they think about the mergers or proposed mergers of very large
business corporations," provides a good gloss on public opinion be-
cause it was repeated in four Roper polls from 1981 to 1985. Table
7 tabulates the proportion of respondents selecting each choice
the polls range between 3 and 5% (the larger samples have smaller errors). Two polls
(those conducted by Penn & Schoen Associates) concerned takeovers exclusively; the
rest were questions regarding takeovers or mergers included in general opinion surveys.
96. The 1988 Penn & Schoen survey included only respondents who stated that they
had "heard something" about hostile takeovers. However, we do not know the source,
extent, or accuracy of their knowledge on hostile takeovers.
97. Few individuals will ever be dire'ctly involved in a takeover. For example, over
80% of the respondents in a 1986 ABC News poll for the Washington Post had never
worked for a firm that had been on either side of an acquisition. In addition, few
Americans hold stock directly; those who hold it indirectly (through shares of mutual
funds or pension plans) neither tender the shares iri a takeover nor vote the shares in a
merger.
98. For a succinct summary of the literature see Fitts, supra note 89, at 1607 n.130.
99. R. McKelvey & P. Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the
Democratic Ideal (manuscript 1986).
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 492 1988-1989
492 CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 57
Table 6. Poll Responses (%): Knowledge about Mergers.





2. Roper (follow in news) 1985 1984 1981*
Follow closely 17 22 19
Follow casually 42 40 35
No attention/don't know 40 38 46
* follow in news attempts by Seagrams, Mobil, Texaco, Dupont and
others to buy Conoco.
Table 7. Poll Responses (%): Feelings on Mergers of Very













































from seven possible choices and the proportion not making a selec-
tion ("don't know/no answer"). The choice of the largest group of
respondents is consistently "no real feelings one way or the other."
The second largest group's choice is consistently "somewhat dissat-
isfied." The proportion of respondents choosing one of the three
positive responses is about the same as the proportion selecting the
two most negative responses, and as the percentage not responding.
The proportion of respondents having negative views is therefore
about twice as large as the positive. When the responses are ex-
amined for cross-sectional variation in the respondents' income
group, occupation, education, and union membership in each poll,
there are no major deviations from the aggregated response.
Hostility or indifference to corporate acquisitions is persistent in
all polls, whether respondents are asked for their views on the con-
sequences of takeovers for the nation or for specific individuals or
groups. For example, as Table 8 indicates, when asked whether
mergers are good or bad for the economy, negative responses out-
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Table 8. Poll Responses (%): Mergers and the .. '
Country/Economy.
Good Bad No Diff. Don't Know
1. 1987, ABC/Money Mag. 20 36 31 13
(large merger, economic
health)
2. 1987, Harris/Bus.Wk. 16 45 34
(country)
3. 1987, NBClWall StJ. 35 46 5# 14
(nation's economy)
4. 1986, ABClWash.Post 24 37 31 8
(economic health)
5. 1984, Roper (large oil cos., 30- 52- - 18
country as a whole)
6. 1988, Penn & Schoen/Coal 13 63 22
(hostile takeovers, U.S.)
Beneficial Hinders No effect Don't Know
7. 1986, Opin. Res. (large 29 36 11 24
mergers, economic growth)
8. 1985, Opin. Res. (same as 25 41 16 17
7.)
9. 1983, Opin. Res. (same as 21 53 14 12
7.)
Disagree Agree Don't Know
10. 1985, Opin. Res. (reduce 31+ 60+ 9
growth of productivity)
11. 1983, Opin. Res. (same as 35+ 57+ 8
10.)




- These entries collapse "very and mostly" responses.+ These entries collapse "strongly and somewhat" responses.
number the positive by a wide margin. However, the proportion of
respondents choosing an indifferent answer (mergers make "no dif-
ference;" mergers have "no effect") is not far behind the proportion
expressing a negative view. The sizeable percentage of respondents
believing that mergers are a problem for the economy is quite likely
related to the Lipset and Schneider finding of the public's distrust of
big business and dislike of corporate concentration. Many of the
questions refer to "large mergers," and a well-k.nown difficulty in
polling is that responses are extremely sensitive to a question's
wording. lOo The negative responses persist when the adjective
100. See generally F. FOWLER, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (1984). The comparability
of the higher negative responses in the 1988 Penn & Schoen poll must be viewed with
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"large" is omitted, but the word merger itself may conjure up the
image of a large corporate entity. 10 I This particular reading of pub-
lic opinion polls, that apprehension over corporate concentration
provides the backdrop for public opinion on mergers, is consistent
with statements of concern about big business and industrial con-
centration in congressional hearings on takeovers. 102 It suggests
that the burden of proof in policymaking is being placed on those
supporting acquisitive activity, for it is associated in the public's
mind with a decline in competition.
When the questions about mergers are phrased more concretely
as affecting individuals than the state of the economy, such as the
effect of takeovers on "average Americans" or on product prices
and quality, as tabulated in Table 9, the proportion of the public
with a negative view, ranging between twenty and forty percent, is
still greater than the positive. But the proportion responding that
mergers have no effect, ranging from thirty-five to forty-eight per-
cent, is frequently higher than the proportion giving negative an-
swers. The percentage with a negative view drops even more
dramatically, to less than one-third, when the question concerns the
effect of mergers on customers of the acquired entity, but the per-
centage of respondents who view mergers as having positive effects
is about the same. In addition, the percentage of respondents with
favorable views of mergers in these questions is substantially lower
than the proportion believing that mergers are good for the econ-
omy. It is hard to explain the discrepancies between beliefs on how
consumers are affected by mergers in contrast to the effect on the
country as a whole. While, as Lipset and Schneider discuss, individ-
some caution as well. The Penn & Schoen respondents were asked about "hostile
takeovers," a far less neutral term than "mergers" or "large mergers." But it would be
hard to sort out public opinion toward hostile takeovers without using that explicitly
pejorative phrase; from this perspective, the attitudes to mergers appear to understate
the magnitude of negative opinion that would be expressed concerning "hostile"
mergers. In this regard, incumbent management has won the day in public relations:
public sentiment would undoubtedly differ if friendly mergers were called "collusive
acquisitions" and hostile takeovers called "independent acquisitions."
I0 I. A conglomerate view of mergers is supported by the response to an Opinion
Research Corporation poll question asking whether mergers result in executives being
responsible for running companies in fields in which they have little knowledge or
expertise: 65% in 1983 and 58% in 1985 agreed with that statement. The new entity,
however, need not be larger. The 1980s is the age of the "bust-up" takeover, in which
the target corporation is streamlined, sheds divisions, and ends up smaller in asset size
than before the acquisitive transaction.
102. E.g., Market Performance and Competition in the Petroleum Industry Hearings, supra note
62, at 1455 (statement of Sen. Jackson); Interfuel Competition: Hearings on S. 489 before the
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
Tax Treatment of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 87 (statement of Sen. Domenici).
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171. 1986, ABClWash. Post
(average American)
2. 1986, Roper Org. (large
merger, product prices)
3. 1986, Roper Org. (very
large merger, product
quality)
4. 1985, Roper Org.
(consumers of merged
entity)
5. 1983, Roper Org. (same
as 4.)
• Good=lower prices response; bad=higher prices response.
+ Good=better quality response; bad=worse quality response.
# Good=benefits response; bad=hurt response.
uals are generally more optimistic about their personal future than
about the country's prospects,103 the differences here are not sys-
tematically more optimistic, nor are the relevant variables even ar-
guably within the respondents' control. These mixed responses
may indicate that the public is generally confused about mergers
and their effects. Confusion in public perceptions is not surprising
as the benefits of corporate mergers are a subject of controversy
across academic disciplines, with financial economists identifying
substantial increases in value at the time of an acquisition while in-
dustrial organization researchers find losses in the years after the
transaction. 104
Additional interesting findings concern the public's perception of
who wins and loses in corporate acquisitions, as detailed in Tables
10 and 11. The responses reflect general ignorance of the findings
in the economic research on takeovers. A substantial majority-
over sixty percent-identify shareholders and officers of acquiring
firms as benefiting from a merger, but only a plurality-roughly
forty-five percent-believes that shareholders of the acquired firm
benefit. Yet empirical research has conclusively shown that share-
holders of acquired firms benefit most substantially-the average
abnormal percentage stock price return over 1962-1987 is thirty-
103. S. LIpSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 91, at 126-29.
104. Compare Jensen & Ruback, The Market jor Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11
J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) with D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-On-S, AND
EC'ONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987).
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Table 10. Poll Responses (%): Mergers and Employment.
More Fewer No Eff. Don't Know
1. 1986, Roper Org. (large 17 42 31 10
mergers, number of jobs)
Disagree· Agree· Don't Know
2. 1985, Opin. Res. (mergers 29 67 4
result in too many layoffs)
3. 1983, Opin. Res. (same as 2.) 35 59 6
Good Bad No Diff+ Don't Know
4. 1987, NBClWall St.]. 33 48 5 14
(are mergers good or bad
for people who work for
cos. involved?)
Lose jobs Not lose jobs Don't Know
5. 1988, Penn &Schoen 71 22 7
(hostile takeovers, cause
people to.· ..)
Agree Disagree Don't Know




* Combines separate responses of "strongly" and "somewhat"
disagree and agree respectively.
+ Voluntary response.
two percent-while the evidence of gains to acquiring shareholders
is inconclusive. lo5 More important, a majority of respondents be-
lieve that acquisitions reduce employment. Approximately forty
percent believe that employees of the acquired firm are hurt by a
merger and thirty-five percent believe that officers of the acquired
105. M. Bradley, A. Desai & E.H. Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and
Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 ]. Fin & Econ. 3
(1988); see generally Jensen & Ruback, supra note 104; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The
Marketfor Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980,2]. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49
(1988). While many studies find acquiring firms earn on average zero abnormal returns
and some find abnormal positive returns, see Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra; Jensen &
Ruback, supra note 104; Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17
]. LEGAL STUD. 165, 191 n.45 (1988) (citing additional studies), others find negative
returns, see Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra (in 1980s acquiring firm shareholders have
averaged an abnormal return of -2.79%); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 104; Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, supra; and sources cited in Schwartz, supra.
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firm are hurt. This perception of the public is odd. For there is no
empirical evidence that acquisitions systematically result in greater
job loss than would occur in the absence of the takeover, although
turnover at the very top is higher after a contested bid. l06
The public's perception that mergers reduce jobs is, of course, in
accord with the concern of many legislators. It also may be a source
of the overall negative attitude toward mergers, because public con~
fidence in institutions shifts with unemployment levels. 107 The puz~
zling aspect, that public opinion on takeovers appears to be
independent of the actual consequences of takeovers, might be ex~
plained by what social psychologists call the "availability heuristic,"
that in judging the relative frequency of an event, such as layoffs
after a takeover, people tend to be influenced by the accessibility of
the event in their cognitive processes, even though accessibility may
be correlated with factors unrelated to the event's objective fre-
quency,lOB For example, news of a plant closing following a take-
over may be vividly remembered and assimilated as corroborating
evidence on the negative consequences of acquisitions while a take-
over in which no employee was fired might not provide disconfirm-
ing evidence because such an acquisition is not dramatic enough to
register with the observer. To the extent that social psychological
research has found that subjective availability affects judgments of
causality,109 the more vividly remembered takeover resulting in un-
employed workers may disproportionately influence public opinion
on mergers. If such an inference heuristic operates, we would fur-
ther expect a more negative view of hostile takeovers than friendly
acquisitions. Because both sides favor a friendly merger, there is
little attendant publicity, or primarily positive press emanating from
management concerning the event, which will make such an event
less vivid or cognitively available than a hostile takeover in which the
management of the target of the unwanted bid generates intensely
vocal negative publicity.
The opinion polls, then, provide a clue as to why takeover-related
legislation, when 'proposed or adopted, is so one-sided against of-
fers: the public, which is generally uninterested in the subject, is ig-
106. See Address by joseph A. Grundfesl, "job Loss and Takeovers," Universily of
Toledo College of Law, March II, 1988; Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions
on LaboT, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQ.UENCES 9 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988);
K. J. Marlin, Firm Performance and Managerial Discipline in Contests for Corporate Control
(manuscripl 1986)
107. S. L!PSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra nOle 91, al 61-66.
108. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 18-19 (1980).
109. Id. al 21-22.
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Table 11. Poll Responses (%): Merger Winners and Losers.
Benefits Hurt Not Much AfT. Don't Know
Target Employees
1985 Roper 15 42 24 19
1983 Roper 16 39 26 19
Target Officers
1985 Roper 28 34 17 20
1983 Roper 27 36 18 19
Bidder Employees
1985 Roper 31 18 35 17
1983 Roper 30 14 39 17
Bidder Officers
1985 Roper 61 6 15 17
1983 Roper 58 7 19 17
Target Shareholders
1985 Roper 46 19 16 20
1983 Roper 44 19 17 20
Bidder Shareholders
1985 Roper 64 6 14 16
1983 Roper 62 6 16 16
Target Consumers
1985 Roper 16 26 38 20
1983 Roper 19 22 39 20
1986 Opin. Res. (Group) Hurt most Benefits most





All about the same(vol.) 1 1
Don't Know 11 8
To what extent are interests other than stockholders' taken into
account when a merger is considered?
Great extent 11
Fair extent 36
Only very little 34
Not at all 10
Don't Know/refused 9
1985 Penn & Schoenrfex.: only financial manipulators, bankers and
lawyers benefit from mergers:
Agree 37 Disagree 51 Don't Know 12
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norant of who actually wins and loses from takeovers and the
inference heuristic operating in such a low-saliency context favors
target management. This situation creates an environment conge-
nial for regulation. There are opinion polls that measure directly
the sentiment for takeover legislation, which are consistent with
such an assessment. As tabulated in Table 12, a majority of the pub-
lic supports government regulation of hostile takeovers. In a May
1987 Louis Harris poll for Business Week, sixty-four percent of re-
spondents favored "new government restrictions" on hostile take-
overs, although in the same poll only forty-five percent had
responded that takeovers were bad for the economy. Similarly, in a
March 1985 Opinion Research Corporation poll, sixty-five percent
of respondents agreed that Congress should limit hostile takeovers
and greenmail. llo In the same poll, fifty-four percent agreed that
government should limit mergers, takeovers or acquisitions. I I I
The federalism aspect of takeover regulation is the focus of a
1988 Penn & Schoen poll for the Coalition to Stop the Raid Against
America, in which respondents were asked to choose between vari-
ous forms of state regulation of hostile takeovers or state provisions
permitting firms to block takeovers, and federal government pre-
emption of the state action. Over half of the respondents chose
state regulation over federal intervention. 1I2 The Lipset and
Schneider study again provides a helpful interpretive gloss. The
110. In this poll, 32% chose the response "strongly agree" and 33% chose the
response "somewhat agree." These opinions may reflect a desire for "balanced"
legislation. But as discussed earlier, supra note 42, whether a greenmail prohibition is a
regulation of target management or hostile bidders is ambiguous. The responses
favoring regulation of both hostile bids and greenmail are, therefore, not necessarily
balanced or inconsistent, although to the extent that they are inconsistent, they are
further evidence of the public's general ignorance of the takeover phenomenon.
III. Of those surveyed, 28% "strongly agreed" and 26% "somewhat agreed". This
data, that the public supports restricting hostile takeovers, could be viewed as consistent
with the general objection, which Lipset and Schneider report, see supra text and
accompanying note 94, to regulation interfering with the running of business
operations. In the March 1985 Opinion Research Corporation poll, 54% of
respondents agreed that companies were "forced to devote too much effort to avoid
hostile takeovers." To the holder of such an attitude, regulation that reduces hostile
takeovers might not be seen as interference with the operations of business. But this
effort at smoothing the conflict between the data on attitudes toward regulation in
general and toward hostile takeovers in particular is, in my opinion, too heroic a
rationalization to be given much weight. The support of regulation is more likely
indicative of a desire to curb the "bad" behavior connoted by the pejorative term
"hostile" takeover.
112. As Table 12 indicates, the largest percentage in the Penn & Schoen poll
supporting the states (79%) was in response to a question phrasing the state action as
protecting shareholder rights. Questions on state action permitting boards to take
varjous defensive tactics all have lower margins of support (under 60%).
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Table 12. Poll Responses (%): Government Regulation of
Takeovers.




2. 1985, Opin.Res., Congress should limit hostile takeovers and
greenmail:
Strongly disagree 11 Strongly agree 33
Somewhat disagree 14 Somewhat agree 32
Don't know/no response 10
3. 1985, Opin.Res., in free economy govt should not do anything to
limit takeovers:
Strongly disagree 28 Strongly agree 18
Somewhat disagree 26 Somewhat agree 22
Don't know/no response 6





5. 1988, Penn & Schoen, states should pass laws [ ], fed. govt.
should stop states from doing so; which position is closer to your
view?
States Fed Not sure
[making takeovers more difficult] 66 25 9
[letting shrs approve a takeover] 79 14 7
[letting bd make takeover harder] 59 30 11
[permitting issuance of poison pill to 58 27 14
block takeover]
[permitting issuance of dual class stock to 56 29 14
block takeover]
strong support for state regulation in the Penn & Schoen survey
could well be a function of the public's greater trust in state rather
than federal government, as well as of the public's dislike of hostile
takeovers. I would not make too much out of the Penn & Schoen
poll responses because the poll did not include as a possible re-
sponse, no government regulation. In addition, the wording of the
questions is troubling, for they imply that the states are protecting
the freedom of shareholders and corporations to choose to engage
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in defensive tactics. However, given the responses in other polls, if
Penn & Schoen had asked for views on the different forms of state
takeover regulation without the juxtaposition of federal interven-
tion, my hunch is that a majority of respondents would still have
supported state regulation.
The 1988 Penn & Schoen poll provided cross-sectional informa-
tion on respondents' direct ownership of stock. Majorities of both
shareholder and nonshareholder respondents favored state regula-
tion. This is an interesting finding, again placing respondents' opin-
ions at odd with empirical research, because several studies have
documented negative stock price effects of state takeover statutes
and poison pill defenses, which were the subject of the poll ques-
tions. 1l3 The responding shareholders' support of regulation could
indicate ignorance. The stock price effects are driven by the expec-
tations of the informed, and in particular, institutional investors,
who are unlikely to be well-represented in a poll based on a random
sample of the population. A random sample of shareholders is
likely to underrepresent informed shareholders, since it is larger
shareholders-particularly institutions-who will be the more in-
formed investors and most shareholders (most members of the pub-
lic) own very few. shares. Indeed, in a poll of relatively well-
informed individuals, a poll of security analysts, a majority of re-
spondents favored federal action to stop the states from regulating
takeovers. 114 However, the Penn & Schoen responses may also be
evidence that some shareholders prefer to trade off the decreased
likelihood of a takeover bid, the likely result of state regulation, for
the statutes' other effect, a higher premium should a bid occur.
Such explanations are consistent with the widespread approval by
shareholders of shark repellent amendments to corporate charters
that raise the cost of a hostile takeover.
The lack of interest in, and knowledge about, takeovers on the
public's part suggests that perceptions are not well-formed and thus
potentially malleable. In such a setting, it is possible that the public
can be educated on the beneficial effects of takeovers, and a
changed, positive sentiment may breed an environment for legisla-
tors, or at least for the executive branch, more resilient to particu-
113. Ryngaerl & Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J. L.,
EcoN., & ORG.-- (fonhcoming 1988); L. Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and
Shareholder Wealth: The Effects of New York s 1985 Takeover Statutes (manuscript 1986); J. G.
Sidak & S. Woodward, supra note 25; Office of the Chief Economist of the SEC, The
Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders (Oct. 23, 1986).
114. See supra text and note 6 (1988 New York Society of Security Analysts'
membership survey).
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larized constituent demands for takeover regulation. There is some
support for this conjecture. Individuals with experience of mergers
have a more favorable attitude toward acquisitions than the public at
large. In a May 1986 poll conducted by ABC News for the Washing-
ton Post, of the seventeen percent who had been employed by a
company involved in a merger, seven percent stated that the merger
was good for the company, three percent said it had no effect and
the remaining six percent said it was bad for the company. Mirror-
ing those responses, four of the seventeen percent stated that the
merger was good for themselves, seven percent said they had not
been effected, and six percent said it was bad for themselves.
Lipset and Schneider are skeptical of the efficacy of educational
efforts at changing negative opinions toward business because they
believe that some attitudes toward business are an ideological com-
mitment. In discussing public attitudes toward business profits,
they note that surveys find the public believes that business profits
are too high but the public also incorrectly calculates profits, pro-
ducing a highly exaggerated figure. I 15 But Lipset and Schneider re-
ject the notion that providing the public with information on the
proper way to calculate profits will alter public opinion; they assert
instead that hostility to business profits is a "reflection of an [anti-
business] attitude," that is self-interested or ideologically-based. 116
I am dubious of their explanation. The public may be slow to up-
date its prior opinion upon receiving contradictory information, but
there is no evidence that it does not update its beliefs. The takeover
issue provides ready examples for testing the proposition: the hos-
tile view of takeovers emanating from the public's suspicion of size
and fear of concentration should be mitigated by information that
hostile bidders profit from selling off significant divisions of targets
and have, in fact, played an important role in the deconglomeration
of American industry. In addition, publication of the empirical find-
ings of who wins and loses in takeovers, and a campaign to increase
the cognitive availability of the positive effects of acquisitions should
affect public opinion. .
There is, of course, an important feasibility problem with an edu-,
cational agenda: who will pay for the time and expense of informing
the public? The likely candidates are institutional investors, for
115. S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 91, at 176-80,361-64.
116. [d. The position on information in the text may not be strictly inconsistent with
Lipset and Schneider's view. My contention is that the public lacks information on what
its self-interest in takeovers is, and in the business profits example, Lipset and Schneider
suggest that the self interest of the members of the public expressing a hostile view on
profits conflicts with the interest of business.
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holding larger blocks of stock than individual investors makes the
benefit closer to the cost of organizing to stop legislation that would
restrict takeovers. 117 Acquirors also have an interest in educating
the public, and are thus another source of organizational entrepre-
neurs. In recent years institutional investors have begun to organ-
ize, establishing associations to share information on proxy voting
positions and to "protect their rights as shareholders," as have
some corporate raiders. I IS These investors have gone beyond op-
posing shark repellent amendments both to begin introducing
shareholder proposals requesting that management stop engaging
in defensive tactics such as issuing poison pills, and to coordinating
with other institutions on the proxy votes. I 19 The step after organi-
zation on policy issues at the individual firm level is organization at
the state or national legislation level. The more states expropriate
shareholder wealth through takeover statutes benefiting other inter-
est groups, the greater will be the individual and group benefits
from organizing.
CONCLUSION
This Article contends that the best predictive evidence-the con-
tent of takeover-related bills over the last twenty-five years-sug-
gests that were Congress to legislate further on takeovers, the most
probable result would be greater restriction of bids. Although Con-
gress moves more slowly to regulate takeovers than the states, this
appears to be more a matter of higher coordination costs and lower
issue saliency rather than differences in the political process. While
there are limits to generalizing from a case study of takeover regula-
tion, one safe conclusion is that we must be more careful in drawing
the implications for policymaking of the traditional externality anal-
ysis of federalism. My data indicate that, although the analysis may
be right as to direction-the states are subject to a negative exter-
nality that can be internalized at the federal level-the magnitude of
117. See, e.g., Borges, Anti-Takeover Measures Protect Management, Hartford Courant, Apr.
10, 1988, at B3 (Conn. state treasurer, in charge of state pension funds, educating public
by editorial against proposed Indiana-type takeover statute).
118. See Pension Fund Trustees Form Council, Wash. Post,Jan. 25,1985, at DI; Institutional
Investors Join Forces for Clout, Wash. Post, May 12, 1985, at Fl. One raider, T Boone
Pickens, has formed his own lobbying group, the United Shareholders Association,
which distributes a newspaper flagging for its readers, among other items, introductions
in state legislatures and Congress of bills regulating takeovers and which lobbied against
Delaware's second generation takeover statute. See Appearances Likely to Prove Deceiving
When It Comes to T. Boone Pickens, Wall St.]., Aug. 22, 1986, at 6, col. I; Sontag, supra note
14.
119. See Holder Resolutions Against Poison Pills Win More Support at Annual Meetings, Wall
St.]., May 13, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
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any internalization effect is very small relative to the other forces
influencing federal legislators. In this regard, federal preemption of
state takeover regulation is a problematic policy, as the hypothe-
sized benefits of avoiding state competition will not be realized, but
the costs of a federalized corporation law will.
The low saliency of takeovers as an issue for most voters, evi-
denced by the public's widespread lack of interest and knowledge
concerning corporate acquisitions, most likely also contributes to
Congress' one-sided yet dilatory progress toward takeover regula-
tion. Not many people care about the problem and by the time
Congress can act, the fire-a particular hostile bid-is out. Low visi-
bility issues provide lobbyists with a large voice in policymaking be-
cause legislators can satisfy the most concerned parties with little
personal cost, as evidenced by the speedy, near-unanimous passage
of state takeover statutes. The public opinion poll data reinforce
the prediction that were Congress to act, it would not be able to
internalize fully the costs of takeover regulation, and it would be-
have in a similar fashion to the states. Given public attitudes toward
and ignorance about takeovers, the policy recommendation of this
Article is that advocates of preemption might best serve their cause
by seeking to educate the public concerning the theoretical and em-
pirical findings on the beneficial effects of takeovers and a competi-
tive market for corporate control. Otherwise they will, in all
likelihood, be sorely disappointed in the legislation that is
produced.
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Appendix
Polling Organization Polling Dates Method Size
1) ABC News; Money 1987 Mar.26-Apr.5 tel 500
Magazine
2) ABC News; 1986 May 15-19 tel 1506
Washington Post
3) CBS News; New York 1986 Jan. 19-23 tel 1581
Times
4) Louis Harris & Assocs. 1987 May 8-12 tel 1250
Business Week
5) Louis Harris & Assocs. 1985 Mar. 2-5 tel 1256
Business Week
6) Louis Harris & Assocs. 1982 Oct. 15-26 tel 1252
Atlantic Richfield
7) NBC News; Wall Street 1987 Mar. 12 tel 1198
Journal
8) Opinion Research 1986 Jui. 11-14 tel lO09
Corp.
9) Opinion Research 1985 Mar. 22-28 tel 1005
Corp.
lO) Opinion Research 1983 Jan. 3-8 tel 1003
Corp.
11) Opinion Research 1954 Aug.23-Sep.3 per 564
Corp.
12) Penn & Schoen Assocs. 1985 Dec. 1-2 tel 900
Texaco (TX only)
13) Penn & Schoen Assocs. 1988 Feb. 13-14 tel 800.
Coalition to Stop the
Raid Against America




15) Roper Organization 1986 Feb. 8-22 per 1993
16) Roper Organization 1985 Aug. 17-24 per 1996
17) Roper Organization 1985 Mar. 23-30 per 2000
18) Roper Organization 1985 Feb. 4-23 per 2000
19) Roper Organization 1984 Aug. 11-18 per 2000
20) Roper Organization 1984 Jui. 7-14 per 2000
21) Roper Organization 1984 Apr. 18-28 per 2000
22) Roper Organization 1983 Feb. 12-26 per 2000
23) Roper Organization 1982 Oct. 23-30 per 2000
24) Roper Organization 1981 Aug. 15-22 per 2000
tel = telephone interview
per = personal interview
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